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Introduction 
 
The modern state has enjoyed roughly five hundred years as the primary mode of 
organizing Western political life.  For the last one hundred and thirty or so years, this 
mode has been realized in the form of the nation-state, an entity which has dominated 
political theory and practice to the extent that, during its career, life in common has been 
rarely conceived without some reference to its structures or operations.  Of course, 
neither the modern state in general, nor the nation-state in particular, have ever gone 
unchallenged.  The infancy of the latter was an especially precarious time for the state-
form, and critical legacies of this early period remain today.  Nonetheless, the nation-state 
has survived, and even matured.  Our world at the beginning of the twenty-first century is 
a world of diverse and sovereign nation-states. 
 But for how long?  The nation-state has once again entered a period of critical 
scrutiny, this one arguably brought on by the very successes of its mature forms.  The 
nation-state has successfully served private capitalist development, which has flourished 
into international free trade that overflows national borders and evades state economic 
policy.  It has served representative democracy, which has also outgrown the state and 
now tends, as in Europe, toward supranational representative polities.  Finally, it has 
served popular self-determination, which has manifested in the international cross-
pollination of cultures, boundary-crossing migrations of expatriates and refugees, and 
identity movements which variously resituate, contest or ignore the structures of the 
nation-state.  In other words, the successes of the modern state appear to have outgrown 
the state-form, and the globalized economic, political and social contours of 
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contemporary life have prompted a widespread reconsideration of the role of the state 
itself.   
This reconsideration has occurred across political spectrums and disciplinary 
boundaries, and it has been attended by diverse attitudes, from optimism which looks 
forward to transnational liberalism or global cosmopolitanism, pessimism which foresees 
post-national forms of imperialism, engagement which agitates for unbordered 
democracy, and resignation which awaits the determination of global social and political 
life by lifeless economic objectivity.1  Despite the diversity of such outlooks, as well as 
the kinds of ascendant post-national polities said to be just over the horizon, these critical 
analyses of the nation state are united in their basic claim: “the ‘Westphalian moment’ is 
passing” (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004, p.1).  In other words, we are currently 
witnessing the eclipse of the state as we know it. 
 At the heart of this claim lies a suspicion that the modern state’s fundamental 
aspiration to territorial sovereignty has been outmoded by the global nature of economic, 
social and political life.  Nowhere is this purported obsolescence more concrete than at 
the borders of the nation-state, the limits which designate the spatial beginning and end of 
sovereign power.  As Ingeborg Maus writes in a recent article: 
There is complete agreement about the essential feature behind the 
obsolescence of the nation-state: the principle of fixed state borders.  This 
principle is understood as one that, by establishing political particularism 
through territorial enclosure, has degenerated into simple provincialism in 
view of the de facto debordering of all important political issues through 
                                                 
1 I have in mind John Rawls in The Law of Peoples and Seyla Benhabib in The Rights of Others and 
Another Cosmopolitanism as the optimists, Jean-Marie Guéhenno in The End of the Nation-State as the 
pessimist, and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in Multitude as the engaged agitators.  The 
characterization of the resigned economic determinist comes from Ingeborg Maus’s scathing diagnosis of 
various forms of global statism in “From Nation-State to Global State, or the Decline of Democracy.” 
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the globalization of economic power and environmental damage as well as 
migration (Maus 2006, p. 466).2 
 
A poster created for the mobilization against the 2007 G8 summit expresses the same 
thought in a different voice: 
Borders.  Rolled out, seemingly arbitrarily.  Segregating.  Stratifying.  
Governed and sometimes guarded.  Between and within territories.  Yet 
these borders are never entirely impermeable.  There are always flight 
lines which take us through them and beyond—their realisation expressive 
of an irrepressible desire.  As deterritorialisation is enacted, everyone finds 
themselves constituent of a new social reality—a process which nobody 
can hold back (FelS and image-shift 2007). 
 
The persistence of territorial borders, so the basic argument goes, is out of step with the 
increasingly deterritorialized and unbordered reality of global affairs. 
   
In this paper, I will critically examine the presumed obsolescence of national 
borders and conclude that such borders may be anachronistic, but they are far from 
obsolete.  In other words, borders—if indeed they are the institutions of a passing 
historical moment—may be out of harmony with the affairs of the present, but this 
disharmony does not undermine their contemporary relevance.  While much has been 
said regarding the persistence of bordered life, I believe the present endeavor to be 
unique.  Below, I trouble the basic argument for obsolescence by revealing it to be based 
on a contrast, not between two incompatible realities—the reality of unbordered life and 
the real function of borders—but between contemporary reality and an outdated ideal.  
What makes borders appear obsolete, in other words, is not what they are, but what they 
ideally are, not what they do, but what they are purported to do.  The contrast is thus 
merely a matter of an unrealized and outmoded ideal.  More importantly, I will argue that 
                                                 
2 This is Maus’s characterization of contemporary thought on the obsolescence of the nation-state; it does 
not characterize her own view.  I engage her views more directly in section IV. 
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the real function of national borders is perfectly compatible with current trends in global 
affairs.  Finally, I will show that the specific function of borders in contemporary social 
and political life suggests the endurance of essential features of the modern state within 
our so-called postmodern world.     
The crux and the uniqueness of this argument will be in providing an account of 
what I have just described as “the real function of national borders.”  By juxtaposing an 
alternative view of borders to established conceptions, I do not mean to claim some kind 
of final epistemic privilege.  I do believe that what I have to say is a correct account of 
“the way things are,” but I do not pretend that the validity of my account is totally 
exclusive.  The central advantage of my conceptualization is that it dissolves an apparent 
contradiction and opens up new diagnostic and productive lines of thought.  Although my 
account is not particularly Foucaultian, it is inspired by Foucault’s analysis of prisons in 
Discipline and Punish.  Here, Foucault very simply identifies how penitentiary 
institutions are, according to their explicit purposes, miserable failures; he then attempts 
to rethink prisons from the point of view of this failure, and identifies effects of 
incarceration that, according to unstated purposes, justify and sustain their operation 
(Foucault 1995, p. 272).  On the other hand, my analysis is rather indebted to Marx, and I 
take seriously his thought that “to formulate a question is to resolve it” (Marx 1978b, p. 
28).  I intend the proposed account of borders to reformulate the question of their 
obsolescence, hopefully complicating its currently vogue resolutions and opening new 
directions for thinking unbordered life.  
 One final note is in order before beginning.  By arguing both for the 
contemporary relevance of territorial boundaries and for the likely persistence of specific 
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forms of modern sovereignty, I do not mean to give an apologia for national borders.  
Rather, I intend my analysis to be deeply critical, both in the sense that it reveals and 
situates itself in a space between the ideal and the real aspects of its object, and in the 
sense that it condemns, and hopes to work against, what it discovers in that space.  I will 
be explicitly normative now so that I do not have to be so in the thick of my analysis: the 
contemporary functioning of national borders is, in my opinion, an unfortunate one.  This 
means that—for myself and for others who find my analysis compelling—there is critical 
work to be done, both theoretical and practical.  However, I also believe the underlying 
function of territorial boundaries to be, at present, ineliminable.  This does not mean that 
further critical work is pointless.  Rather, like all important critical engagement, it must 
be deeper than would at first appear necessary.  I will return to this thought briefly in the 
final section of this paper.  For now, I turn to the purported obsolescence and evolving 
ideal of national borders. 
 
The Ideal and Institutionalization of Sovereign Territory 
 At the heart of most arguments for the obsolescence of national borders is a 
growing skepticism regarding the linkage of territoriality and sovereignty that is central 
to the modern state.  Although territory and authority have been interrelated since at least 
the late middle ages, contemporary political geography confirms that a “sovereign 
territorial ideal,” formalized by the Peace of Westphalia, has held almost exclusive 
influence in political thought and practice since the 17th century (Murphy 1996, p. 82).  In 
this conceptual framework, state power is conceived as extending primarily over a space 
and secondarily over its inhabitants, who may come and go without fundamentally 
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altering the extent of state sovereignty.3  This primacy of space to people structures Max 
Weber’s classical definition of the state, which claims, “The state is the form of human 
community that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence 
within a particular territory—and this idea of ‘territory’ is an essentially defining feature” 
(Weber 2004, p. 33).  Weber’s emphasis on the use of violence and its spatial dominion, 
together with his lack of emphasis on the population subject to violence within that space, 
is typical of the modern ideal of sovereignty.  The notion of popular sovereignty realized 
in the contemporary nation-state maintains this emphasis by defining a population largely 
in terms of its geographic coherence, and by making citizenship primarily a matter of 
birth or residency within a state’s territory.4  Thus, even today, “sovereignty is almost 
inextricably linked to territoriality” (Ansell 2004, p. 7). 
 The modern link between sovereignty and territory entails that the latter must be 
well-defined so that the former can be unambiguous; hence the importance of borders. 
“As the government of people gave way to the government of territory, so the need for 
clearly bounded divisions of ownership and control correspondingly increased…  
Territoriality thus became one of the first conditions of the state’s existence, and the sine 
qua non of its borders” (Donnan and Wilson 1998, p. 8).5  National borders are thus the 
                                                 
3 Foucault puts this well in his discussion of Machiavelli in “Governmentality:” “Sovereignty is not 
exercised on things, but above all on territory and consequently on the subjects who inhabit it” (Foucault 
2001, p. 208; italics mine).  
4 “The nation-state introduced a precise sense of territorial identity and of territorial control” (Anderson 
1996, p. 25). Additionally, Alexander Murphy shows that the territorial understanding of sovereignty was 
intensified, rather than undermined, by the rise of the nation-state and the location of sovereignty in the 
people rather than the ruler (Murphy 1996, p. 96).  His fundamental claim is that contemporary conceptions 
of political life remain beholden to the political-territorial understanding of sovereignty (Ibid, p. 81-2, 110-
2).  See also Donnan and Wilson 1998, p. 7-11.  I come back to the nation-state’s territorial definition of 
“the people” of popular sovereignty in section V. 
5 Ilido do Amaral makes a similar point, with more explicit attention to the link between sovereignty and 
territoriality: “As the sovereign state has replaced earlier forms of large political regions, it has become 
essential that sovereignty should have a known exact extent, a territory under exclusive jurisdiction limited 
by state boundaries” (do Amaral 1994, p. 21). 
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legacy of the sovereign territorial ideal, and, along with this ideal, their necessity has 
gone largely unquestioned since the birth of the modern state.  The importance of both 
was significantly confirmed in the aftermath of World War II, when world maps were 
redrawn and borders reconstructed in an attempt to establish a specific “political-
territorial order whose stability was assumed to be the sine qua non for global stability” 
(Murphy 1996, p. 83).  Inasmuch as these redrawn and reconstructed lines still structure 
our geopolitical, political, military, social and economic visions of the world, the 
sovereign territorial ideal endures today. 
 However, during the very moment of its confirmation, the territorial ideal of 
sovereign power began to be challenged by the deterritorialized or cross-territorial nature 
of social, economic and political life.  These challenges included the mass migrations and 
general displacement caused by the devastation of world war, as well as regional famines, 
ethnic conflict within and across states and widespread environmental destruction.  
Moreover, and largely in response to these and other global issues, new forms of 
international cooperation required a progressive “unbundling of territoriality” that 
partially dislocated sovereignty from its geographic centers (Ruggie 1993, p. 171).  Thus, 
former military alliances congealed into international organizations such as NATO, 
which challenged the Weberian triangulation of sovereignty, territory and the legitimate 
use of violence (especially later, with its use of interventionist tactics in the final decades 
of the twentieth century).  Economic partnerships formed between even former enemies, 
resulting in entities such as the European Steel and Coal Community and European 
Economic Community, precursors of the economically and politically integrated 
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European Union.6  International political organizations such as the United Nations and 
the Arab League were founded with the intent of protecting national-political sovereignty 
through international cooperation, effectively buttressing a commitment to the sovereign 
territorial ideal with an admission of its inadequacy.  In short, the latter half of the 
twentieth century was characterized by a both an affirmation of the sovereign territorial 
ideal and, simultaneously, the progressive deterritorialization of important economic, 
social and political affairs. 
 To many observers, the latter trend promises the eclipse the former.  According to 
the basic argument, today’s globalized world, with its Nike, NAFTA, WTO, EU, and 
Internet, renders increasingly obsolete both the sovereign territorial ideal and its primary 
institutional manifestation, the national border.7  However, it is crucial to understand that 
the institution is not identical to the ideal, and the former may significantly outlive the 
latter.  If territoriality remains, as political anthropologists Donnan and Wilson put it, “the 
sine qua non of…borders,” then a trend toward deterritorialized global life would suggest 
the decline of geopolitical boundaries (Donnan and Wilson 1998, p. 8).  However, the 
original requirement for the institution may have been replaced by another underlying 
condition, ensuring the permanence of the institution beyond its original “sine qua non.”  
Below, I argue that this is the case.  However, before I can clarify the relation between 
the ideal and the institution of sovereign territoriality, an understanding of the institution 
itself is necessary.  Thus, I now postpone the question of the obsolescence of borders 
until much later, in order to explore the changing concept of national boundaries, and to 
change it once more.   
                                                 
6 John Ruggie cites the European Community as a prime example of the territorial “unbundling” (Ruggie 
1993, p. 171). 
7 See Paasi 1999, p. 70-2 and Ohmae 1996, p. 11 for more explicit versions of the typical argument. 
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   
Modern political thought has long considered national borders to be lines or 
regions that, whether visible or invisible, or designated by natural or artificial features, 
mark the recognized limits of a state's territory and establish a dichotomy of 
internality/externality through which adjacent polities relate to one another.8  Internally, a 
border designates a domestic space by circumscribing an area of sovereign authority; 
externally, a border designates a foreign area outside of that sovereignty.  This foreign 
space is usually the domestic space of another sovereign entity; thus, each side of a 
border is both an inside and an outside, relative to the political spaces which it 
simultaneously joins and separates.  As the membrane between inside and outside, a 
border regulates the cooperative or conflictual contact of domestic and foreign elements. 
Importantly, borders also inscribe the populations that inhabit the area which they 
bound.  Consistent with the sovereign territorial ideal, by marking a geographic space of 
sovereignty, borders define, with some exceptions, the persons who are subject to that 
sovereignty (in more democratic permutations of the modern state, these persons are also 
the origin of sovereignty).  Borders thus construct the collective political identity, the 
                                                 
8 There are, of course, many types of borders.  My analysis is primarily concerned with the borders of 
modern nation-states, although many of its claims could apply, with some adjustment, to spatialized 
political boundaries at the sub- and superstate levels, including temporary borders such as police lines.  For 
brevity, I sometimes refer to the boundaries of nation-states as ‘national borders’; in doing so I intend to 
refer to the borders of a legal-political nation-state, not the borders of a cultural, ethnic or linguistic nation.  
My claims as to the evolving conceptualization of national borders are derived primarily from scholarship 
in political anthropology and geopolitics, two relatively new academic fields, rather than older traditions in 
political science and political theory.  This is because these newer disciplines give specific attention to what 
borders are and what borders do in ways that other fields do not.  Despite the recent development of these 
disciplines, they are by no means ahistorical.  For deep historical overviews of the conceptualization of 
borders, see Anderson 1996, Baud and van Schendel 1997, Borgatta and Montgomery 2001, Paasi 2005b; 
for overviews of historical iterations of the border concept within twentieth century scholarship, see do 
Amaral 1994, Donnan and Wilson 1998 and 1999, Newman 2003, 2006a and 2006b, and van Houtum 
2005.  My claims are derived from a synthesis of these sources.  Finally, I use the terms ‘border’ and 
‘boundary’ interchangeably in order to clarify the contexts of the material I cite.  As Henk van Houtum 
notes, the anthropological referent of ‘border’ confusingly maps on to the geopolitical term ‘boundary’ and 
vice versa; I mix terms in order to keep the referents constant across disciplines (van Houtum 2005, p. 672).     
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demos or “the people” of a polity.  This relatively homogenous identity may not map onto 
other forms of social or political identity, even those that persons consider to be their 
primary or most important identity.  However, this does not mean that the “we” 
constructed by borders is merely formal; its significance is proportionate to that of the 
sovereignty to which it is subject.   Additionally, there is much evidence to suggest that 
geopolitical boundaries contribute significantly to the composition and articulation of 
other forms of social identity.9 
 This modern account of borders, which was exclusively dominant in Western 
political thought until the second half of the 20th century, considers borders to be 
things— “limits,” “barriers to social and economic processes,” “lines,” “political 
membranes,” or “the physical and static outcome of a political decision-making 
process.”10  Expanding the classification outlined by contemporary political geographer 
David Newman, I will call these thing-centered views “traditional” geopolitical accounts 
of borders (Newman 2006a, p. 172).11  Traditional views consider the thing-ness of 
borders in a dual light; borders are both the agents of specific activities (i.e., demarcating, 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Douglas 1998; Jukarainen 2005; Paasi 1999, 2005a; Sahlins 1998; Villa 2000. 
10 Borgatta and Montgomery 2001, p. 1931; Biger and The International Boundaries Research Unit, 1995, 
p. 11; Ibid; Donnan and Wilson 1998, p. 9; Newman 2006a p. 175.  By ‘thing’ I intend its most common 
sense in the English language, similar to the senses of ‘object’ or ‘entity’.  A thing is ontologically 
individual.  Without plunging into metaphysical theory, I will refer to the second use of the entry “thing” 
given by the Oxford English Dictionary: “An entity of any kind…  That which exists individually (in the 
most general sense, in fact or in idea); that which is or may be in any way an object of perception, 
knowledge, or thought; a being, an entity… That which has separate or individual existence;  …A material 
object, a body; a being or entity consisting of matter, or occupying space” (OED, “Thing” II: 7-13).  A 
thing may exist in fact or in idea; thus it need not be material or physical.  What is common to these 
definitions, however, is its ontological individuality.  A thing is distinct from other things, events or acts.    
11 Newman’s review of 20th century border scholarship characterizes “traditionalists among border 
scholars” as “those whose understanding of borders is synonymous with the physical lines of separation 
between the States and countries of the international system (Newman 2006a, p. 172).  Among these, he 
includes the geographers Richard Hartshorne, Thomas Holdich, C. Fawcett, A.P. Brigham and Stephen 
Jones.  See also Berg and van Houtum 2003, p. 1-3 for a similar characterization.  I intend my use of the 
term “traditional” to also include any functionalist account of borders that presupposes the existence of the 
border as an independent thing.  
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constituting and regulating spaces) and the recipients of other activities (i.e., opening, 
closing, transgressing or defending).  However, what is crucial to traditional views is the 
convention that borders, as things, are ontologically distinct from these activities.  
Borders are brought into being, constituted, altered or eliminated by actions, and they 
perform actions themselves, but they themselves are things, not actions.  To employ 
grammatical terms, traditional geopolitical views considers borders to be exclusively the 
referents of nouns, and thus the potential subjects and objects of verbs. 
In their influential anthropology of borders, Hastings Donnan and Thomas Wilson 
give a contemporary conceptualization which is typical of traditional geopolitical 
accounts.  They write: 
Borders are the political membranes through which people, goods, wealth 
and information must pass…  Thus borders are agents of a state’s security 
and sovereignty, and a physical record of a state’s past and present 
relations with its neighbors.  In our view, borders have three elements: the 
legal borderline which simultaneously separates and joins states; the 
physical structures of the state which exist to demarcate and protect the 
borderline, composed of people and institutions which often penetrate 
deeply into the territory of the state; and frontiers, territorial zones of 
varying width… (Donnan and Wilson 1998, p. 9). 
 
This conceptualization is significantly more complex than earlier versions of the 
traditional view, which focus almost exclusively on the first element identified by 
Donnan and Wilson.  Nonetheless, the functions and elements of the border are here too 
described in terms of things.  Also unlike earlier traditional views, the anthropologists 
take into account the discursive and symbolic productivity of borders when they 
conclude, “Borders are physical, literal structures of the state, which also structure a 
range of meanings and belongings associated with various identities” (Donnan and 
Wilson 1998, p. 25).  However, this conclusion retains the basic convention of traditional 
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geopolitical accounts by considering borders to be things first and foremost; borders are 
structures that also structure.  As things, Donnan and Wilson’s borders are the subjects 
and objects of activities that are conceptually distinct from the borders themselves.  
Traditional accounts of borders such Donnan and Wilson’s begin to give way 
once the construction, emplacement and maintenance of borders are understood as 
continually active processes.  Like all human artifacts, borders do not simply exist once 
they are produced.  They must be constantly established, maintained, enforced, and 
enacted if they are to remain real and effective.  The border-as-thing cannot exist without 
these practices, so much so that it becomes difficult to pinpoint where the underlying 
thing ends and the actions performed by and upon it begin.   
Moreover, both the concept and the reality of a border are inseparable from 
variable sets of institutionalized or habituated practices, meanings and discourses that 
structure not only the function, maintenance, and enforcement of the border, but also the 
ways it is experienced and understood by insiders, outsiders and border-crossers.  These 
practices, meanings and discourses constitutively affect the nature of the border itself, 
suggesting that “the border itself” is a fiction.  Thus, a policed border is different from an 
unpoliced border in terms of what it represents, the ways it is experienced and how it 
shapes identities on either side of it.  Moreover, the same policed border may differ 
significantly in times of war and times of peace.  Similarly, a border’s roles and 
signification change dramatically from periods during which the political identity of the 
bounded population is stable to those in which its identity is uncertain.12  In short, borders 
are socially constructed institutions, which suggests the arbitrariness of any distinction 
                                                 
12 I have in mind the US’s recent surge of anti-immigrant discourse and corresponding legislation, as well 
as the newly intensified policing of its southern border, all of which followed shortly after the national 
identity crisis raised by the Hurricane Katrina disaster. 
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between the thing-ness of a border and the activities and discourses which materially and 
conceptually construct it.13   
Consequently, some recent theorizations of borders abandon the traditional 
geopolitical emphasis on the border as a thing and turn their focus to “the way that 
borders are socially constructed… managed… and impact our daily life practices” 
(Newman 2006a, p.172-3).  These new conceptualizations—which, for reasons discussed 
below, I will call “neotraditional” geopolitical views—analyze borders in terms of 
“processes that exist in socio-cultural action and discourses” (Paasi 1999, p. 72).  To the 
neotraditionalist, “The border as a concept is not so much an object or phenomenon, 
something to erase or install, but rather an ongoing, repetitive process that we encounter 
and produce ourselves in our daily lives” (Berg and van Houtum 2003, p. 1-2).  Whereas 
traditional accounts held the institution of the border—the individual thing—to be 
separate from, and analytically prior to, the actions and discourses which surround it, 
neotraditional accounts refuse to prioritize “border objects” over their “objectification 
processes” or institutions over their institutionalization (van Houtum et al 2005, p. 3). 
In short, according to the neotraditional view, “the border is now understood as a 
verb in the sense of bordering” (van Houtum 2005, p. 672).  Bordering is “the 
construction, the making of borders,” where borders are understood as “sociospatially 
constructed differences” (Ibid, p. 674, 672).  This expanded concept of the border entails 
that bordering “need not be restricted to the entity of states alone;” thus neotraditionalists 
identify borders and bordering wherever collectivities are structured by formal or 
informal criteria for membership, even “on the local and micro scales of spatial activity” 
                                                 
13 The notion of social construction that I am employing is loosely derived from Peter Berger and Thomas 
Luckman’s The Social Construction of Reality.  
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(Ibid, p. 674; Newman 2006a, p. 172).  In neotraditional theories of borders, geopolitical 
analysis thus converges with sociology.  Newman’s recent work on bordering is 
representative:  
Borders exist in almost every aspect of society, categorizing humanity into 
those who belong to the group… and those who do not…  The ‘here-there’ 
and ‘us-them’ cut-off points are not always played out through the 
construction of physical and visible walls and fences.  They may be as 
invisible as they are tangible and, equally, as perceived as they are real.  I 
define you as belonging to a different social, ethnic, economic or religious 
group and, as such, I have created a border separating the self from the 
other (Newman 2006a, p. 176-7). 
 
Newman’s emphasis on the social production of borders—as the social production of 
difference—allows him to theorize a continuity between the macro-level political 
interactions of states and the micro-level social interactions of individuals.  
Neotraditional views such as Newman’s address the shortcomings of traditional 
geopolitical understandings of borders insofar as they theorize the materially and 
discursively active life of national boundaries.  However, they do not completely abandon 
the traditional emphasis on the border as a thing, even if bordering—as the dynamic 
construction, negotiation, and impact of this thing—has become the object of 
theorization.  This is because the “border object” and its “objectification processes” 
remain conceptually dependent upon one another; the concept of the border remains at 
the heart of the concept of bordering, and vice versa.  Thus, when theoretical focus shifts 
from borders to bordering, from the object to its objectification, or from the institution to 
its institutionalization, the latter term inherits the ontological independence that is central 
to traditional accounts of the border-object; hence the designation “neo-traditional.”  In 
other words, borders-as-processes continue to be treated as entities that are engendered 
by the actions of persons but that are conceptually distinct from those actions, functioning 
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as independent things that can be subjects and objects of new actions.  As such, borders-
as-bordering occupy the same role in neotraditional theories as borders-as-things do in 
traditional accounts: they exist, independently, as something between social subjects and 
external to them.  To complete the grammatical illustration employed by van Houkum, 
“the border is now understood as a verb in the sense of bordering,” but the verb 
corresponds to no subject, and it functions like the noun it has replaced; thus it does not 
change the overall logical structure or syntax of the theory (van Houkum 2005, p. 672).  
In short, by treating processes as independent things, the structure of neotraditional 
theories preserves the traditional thing-ness of the border concept. 
This subtle preservation of the border-as-thing in neotraditional accounts is not 
problematic in itself, but it conflicts with the extension of the bordering concept into 
everyday social interactions.  At the level of geopolitical institutions, the borders that join 
and separate states do seem to be things—things that are both materially and discursively 
constructed, which separate lands and populations into territories and peoples and 
mediate the interactions of these.  Even if we understand state borders as socially 
constructed processes of differentiation, we treat them as processes that exist between us 
and our neighbors, simultaneously holding us together and keeping us apart.  Hence, 
neotraditional theories of bordering appear to correctly analyze national borders.   
However, such theories become problematic when they analyze the direct social 
interactions of individuals.  Here again, the ontological independence inherited by the 
bordering process manifests itself as an independent mediator between social subjects, 
but now this misrepresents the encounter.  For example, when Newman, in his account of 
social bordering, writes, “I define you as belonging to a different social, ethnic, economic 
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or religious group and, as such, I have created a border separating the self from the 
other,” he introduces a third party to our interaction—a border or bordering process—that 
performs the act of separation for us (Newman 2006a, p. 176-7, my italics).  This 
description is subtly but importantly mistaken.  By placing you in an out-group, I 
separate us; there is nothing between us—no thing I have materially or discursively 
created, no process that I have initiated—that mediates our interaction for us.  Thus, by 
implicitly conferring the ontological independence of things onto active processes 
between subjects, neotraditional accounts of borders theoretically displace the action of 
interaction from concrete social actors to a non-existent third-party.     
Neotraditional accounts thus fail to adequately theorize the social interactions of 
concrete subjects.  However, this failure is instructive, in that it raises new questions 
about the operation of political boundaries, questions not yet broached by geopolitical 
theory or political anthropology.  If, as I have just suggested, the theoretical introduction 
of a social border between social subjects appears to displace the agency of their 
interaction, might not we expect the emplacement of political borders between political 
subjects to affect a similar displacement?  Why does it seem intuitive that the interaction 
of social subjects be unmediated by any external entity, but equally intuitive that the 
interaction of political subjects be mediated by borders?  What is at stake in this 
difference, and what can it tell us about borders and the individuals and groups on either 
side of them? 
In the next section of this paper, I approach these questions through a 
philosophical analysis of borders and bordering that inverts the conceptual orientation of 
the theories discussed above.  Whereas contemporary geopolitical theories of borders 
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extend analyses of state interaction to local, non-state contexts, I will base my own 
account on ways that individuals negotiate identity, and then extend this to suggest ways 
that states might.  Doing so will allow me to eventually re-approach the sovereign 
territorial ideal, and its central institution, through a recovery of the concrete individuals 
that have been overlooked by modern sovereignty’s subordination of subjects to space. 
 
Rethinking Bordering and Borders  
In this section, I reorient the investigation of national borders by seeking to 
understand what is at stake in the differences between everyday social bordering and the 
borders enacted between states.  To do so, I will reverse the direction of recent 
geopolitical thought by attempting to develop a theory of borders out of a theory of 
bordering.  I begin by articulating a new account of bordering that avoids two modern 
conventions which geopolitical theory rightly ascribes to national borders but wrongly 
imputes to social bordering: the explicit or implicit emphasis on an ontologically 
individual and agential thing that mediates difference, and the disciplinary emphasis on 
spatiality that locates difference in some socio-spatial no man’s land between social or 
political subjects.  In the second half of this section, I develop a theory of national 
borders out of this purified foundation, so that, in section IV, I can positively indicate the 
ways in which these conventions attach themselves to our thinking about state borders.  
Doing so will not only show up the difference between social bordering and state borders; 
it will also reveal what it is about the latter that makes them surprisingly relevant to our 
globalizing world.  Before specifying a new concept of bordering, however, I need to 
clarify the theoretical groundwork on which it is constructed. 
 18 
   
A basic concept of bordering can be developed from philosophical theories of 
identity formation via difference.  One such theory is elaborated by William Connolly in 
Identity/Difference, where he writes: “An identity is established in relation to a series of 
differences that have become socially recognized… Identity requires difference in order 
to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty” 
(Connolly 1991, p. 64).  Because it depends upon a recognized distinction from whatever 
it is not, every identity is made possible by what Derrida might call its “constitutive 
outside.”  Inasmuch as identities are always relationally constituted, each contains traces 
of its other.  Additionally, identities are never fixed or final, because the relations 
between them are never stable; difference is continually constructed and negotiated 
through ongoing series of “identifications and negations” performed by the persons 
making “identity claims” (Ibid, p. 199).  Consequently, the “self-certainty” to which 
identities aspire can never be achieved.  As Connolly puts it, “Identity is thus a slippery, 
insecure experience, dependent on its ability to define difference and vulnerable to the 
tendency of entities it would so define to counter, resist, overturn, or subvert definitions 
applied to them” (Ibid, p. 64).  In other words, identity is always up for grabs. 
It is important that this account, while using the language of inside and outside, 
does not use the language of border, frontier, or line.  Unless Connolly is specifically 
referring to the territorial boundedness of a state, his use of spatial metaphors never posits 
an entity between inside and outside.  In fact, he only employs the language of space or 
internality and externality to describe ways that selves experience the claims of their own 
identities in relation to the identities of others, and he constantly breaks down any static 
distinction between inside and outside (Ibid, p. 40).  Inside and outside, then, are not 
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spaces, but relations that are constantly created and recreated by identities as they 
negotiate difference (Ibid, p. 160).  Crucially, Connolly is careful not to hypostasize such 
relations, or difference itself, as any sort of thing or process that mediates identities from 
an external, in-between space.  Rather, he analyses the relations of one identity to another 
in terms of their own actions; identities are related only by actively including, excluding, 
distinguishing, negating or identifying with each other’s claims (Ibid, p. 65-8, 160-1).  In 
short, identity is constructed through difference, where difference is not a third thing 
relating two identities, but their unmediated interaction.  Identity, then, is not so much a 
possession or attribute of an individual or collective self, but a series of actions that the 
self performs upon others and that others perform upon it. 
Connolly’s theory provides a solid basic account of the negotiation of social 
identities, but in order to better understand the status of actions like identification, 
inclusion and exclusion, we need to supplement it.14  Following Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe, we can conceive the constitutive relation of identities vis-à-vis 
difference as “an articulatory practice which constitutes and organizes social relations… 
among elements such that their identity is modified” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p. 96, 
105).  Central to this idea is the recognition that “articulation is a practice, and not the 
name of a given relational complex,” (Ibid, p. 93-4).  In other words, identity is actively 
created in the (potentially antagonistic) discursive interplay of articulatory acts; there are 
no relations between subjects other than the convergence or collision of their 
                                                 
14 Another way to enrich this account—a way that I am not yet prepared to undertake—is to incorporate the 
psychoanalytic concept of identification developed in Freud and Lacan.  I want to mark this for future 
exploration, because I believe importing psychoanalytic theory would in some ways deepen the conclusions 
of my paper.      
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articulations.15  In this context, “discursive” should not be taken to mean merely linguistic 
or idealistic; Laclau and Mouffe’s analysis rejects any “distinction between discursive 
and non-discursive practices,” as well as “any distinction between what are usually called 
the linguistic and behavioural aspects of a social practice,” by affirming that “every 
object is constituted as an object of discourse, insofar as no object is given outside every 
discursive condition of emergence,” including the rejected distinctions (Ibid, p. 107-8).  
Finally, in a way that both anticipates and deepens Connolly’s claim that identity is 
“slippery” and “insecure,” Laclau and Mouffe clarify that articulatory practice is never 
complete; neither the total discursive ensemble of identities, nor the constitution of any 
single identity, are ever fully fixed (Ibid, p. 110-1).  Consequently, every identity must be 
constantly articulated if it is to maintain any coherence, and therefore it must continually 
re-relate to other identities through the active negotiation of difference.16 
Drawing on the theoretical work of Connolly, Laclau and Mouffe, I propose that 
bordering is the discursive practice of articulating difference through which identities are 
unceasingly formed, deformed and reformed.  Here, difference is not a thing or 
relationship between two identities (i.e., difference is not a difference), but the necessary 
mode of any interaction of any numerically non-identical entities.  Difference is inherent 
in plurality; as such, it is in itself neither divisive nor integrative.  Thus, whether 
identities are brought together or kept apart, and whether they are cooperative or 
antagonistic, does not depend on difference, but its articulation.  The articulation of 
                                                 
15 Hence, Laclau and Mouffe’s use of the phrase “subject positions” is potentially misleading.  The 
positions in question are defined through articulatory practices and are more like positions on a issue than 
spatial positions (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p. 109). 
16 In an article written by Laclau and Lillian Zac, this thought is illuminatingly expressed in psychoanalytic 
terms: “As any identification takes place through contents which are essentially inadequate to this 
fulfillment, the identification will be constitutively incomplete and will have to be always recreated through 
new identification acts” (Laclau and Zac 1994, p. 16). 
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difference occurs, on the one hand, in the act of claiming recognition for any identity and, 
on the other hand, in the acts of accepting, rejecting or ignoring, identifying with or 
differentiating from, and including or excluding such claims.  It is the active orientation 
of oneself to the identity of another.  Thus, articulations of difference neither create 
something new nor manipulate something already existing; other than the identities of the 
interacting subjects, there is no other thing involved.  Consequently, bordering is not the 
construction of something between subjects, but the direct interaction of subjects via 
discursive acts of identification and differentiation. 
 Several features of this account must be elaborated.  First, neither claims to 
recognition, nor the responses to them, need be explicit or conscious.  Identities are 
constantly interacting, cooperating, competing, provoking, petitioning and impinging 
upon one another.  Often, we are not aware of the ways our own identity interacts with 
others.  We usually do not register all of the claims we make, the significance that our 
presence has for others, or the ways in which we are read by them.  In particular, we 
frequently do not recognize the violence that our identity claims do to others; likewise, 
others may not recognize the violence we do to them.  Similarly, we rarely respond to the 
claims of others consciously, and these responses are often unconsciously interpreted.  
Consequently, much of the bordering that we do on a day-to-day basis happens without 
our explicit knowledge of it.  For instance, we border others not only when we actively 
discriminate against them, but also when we are unable to see them, or to hear their 
claims.  We border when we size each other up and consciously or unconsciously 
evaluate each other.  We border through the ways we present ourselves and perceive 
others, through body language, attitudes, and the beliefs we hold.  Every component of 
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our identities is shaped through bordering, and bordering occurs in every interaction of 
our identities. 
Second, bordering occurs not only in the interaction of individual identities, but 
also in the active interplay of collective identities.  The identity of a group forms through 
the internal interactions of in-group identities, as well as the interactions between in-
group and out-group identities.  In fact, the same can be said of the identity of an 
individual, once it is recognized that individual identity is constituted out of competing 
claims that interact within the same person.  Internal and external bordering is therefore 
common to both individuals and groups, and there is continuity between the way 
individual and collective identities are formed.  Third, despite this continuity, bordering 
need not make reference to any collective identity at all.  Bordering need not be, as 
Newman has it in his example, a matter of sorting individuals into groups or separating a 
self from other against a larger background of ‘us’ and ‘them’.  The articulation of 
difference can be, and usually is, intimate and specific, without invoking patterns of 
discrimination, inclusion and exclusion or the negotiation of collective identities.     
Fourth, bordering is not exclusive to face-to-face interactions.  Articulations of 
difference can happen at a distance, or when the other is present to the self only as a 
memory, an anticipation, an idea, or a prejudice.  This suggests that, fifth, bordering may 
be based on identities or interactions with identities that do not exist.  Bordering may 
happen on the grounds of a misperceived identity claim, on a misunderstood interaction, 
or even as the interaction with a fictional, nonexistent identity.  This last possibility 
happens most often when identities are distorted, exaggerated, or made-up, as in racist 
imagination or nationalist propaganda.  Importantly, this is most likely in contexts of 
 23 
pervasive faith, hope or fear, such as when a sect orients itself toward a mythological 
savior, or a nation orients itself toward an imaginary or exaggerated threat.  
Sixth, bordering is not an exclusively divisive activity.  Articulations of difference 
can be positive as well as negative, approving as well as disapproving.  In fact, 
difference, as a mode of interaction, is a necessary condition for approval, admiration, 
attraction, appreciation, and all other positive orientations to an other.  The same is true 
for all negative orientations to others.  Nonetheless, bordering does not lend itself to the 
latter more than the former; bordering joins as well as separates individual and collective 
subjects. 
Finally, bordering is an imminently social activity, and because humans are social 
creatures (either by nature or by convention), we are bordering creatures.  In only 
extreme and extremely rare cases are humans ever fully alone; the overwhelming 
majority of human beings live social lives, speak shared languages, or employ common 
conceptual categories.  As such, difference is a mode of living that does not expire, and it 
is articulated constantly, in every one of our interactions.  As non-identical subjects who 
are continually, in some way, in the presence of others, human beings are bordering 
beings.   
   
The fully elaborated concept of bordering can now be used to analyze the 
phenomenon of state borders.  As discussed above, modern thought identifies several key 
functions of such borders: they manifest a relationship of inside/outside that 
simultaneously constitutes and differentiates a state; they bound a population and regulate 
the inclusion and exclusion of potential community members so as to create and sustain a 
common political identity; and they designate the difference between the familiarly 
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domestic and the foreign or alien.  Each of these functions can now be understood as the 
articulation of difference; the functions ascribed to national borders are operations of 
identification and differentiation by which the members of nation-states articulate their 
collective political identities vis-à-vis other identities.  Borders are thus instances of 
bordering.  As such, they are not individual objects or independent processes that exist 
between subjects and mediate them; nor are borders the production of such entities.  
Rather, borders simply are the direct and reciprocal bordering interactions of multiple 
identities upon one another.  Through the practice of bordering, relationships of 
internality/externality emerge, political identities are constituted, and spheres of 
domesticity and foreignness are demarcated—but these functions are effects of the 
bordering activity of particular individuals and groups, not the operations of 
independently existing things or processes. 
The subjects of this bordering activity are the individuals and groups commonly 
thought of as being “on either side” of the border.  However, this spatial language is 
misleading.  It is more correct to say that the bordering subjects are all of those identities 
that participate in the bordering interaction—all of the subjects and objects of identity 
claims who are simultaneously the objects and subjects of the responses to these claims.17  
As mentioned above, these subjects do not have to confront one another directly; rather, it 
is enough that their identities be invoked in the interaction. 
On this account, borders are analyzed as instances of bordering activity, but not 
every articulation of difference is a border.  Rather, borders are ensembles of coordinated 
articulations, and it is the density of these ensembles that sets borders apart from the rest 
                                                 
17 Of course, subjects are constantly articulating difference simultaneously with multiple others, so any 
language of claim and then response is a little misleading.  Temporally, these two apparently distinct 
moments should be collapsed. 
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of the bordering discourse.  The ensembles are not more than their component 
articulations.  They are simply a plurality of equivalent articulations that are coordinated, 
not by some relation, agent, or operation external or prior to them, but by virtue of their 
discursive equivalence.18  In other words, the ensembles are an effect of the frequent 
repetition, interrelation and interchangeability of particular identity claims, responses and 
counter-claims made by a plurality of subjects.  Borders, to put it roughly, are ensembles 
of bordering acts that are “about” similarly and interrelatedly articulated difference. 
Because national-political identities can be negotiated through claims that appeal 
to formal and universalist categories (i.e., the category of citizenship, or the equal 
protection of all persons), the acts of bordering that negotiate these identities can achieve 
an especially high degree of equivalence.  Moreover, the state has the resources—for 
example, in the form of shared media, propaganda, and national languages, traditions and 
histories—to encourage the same discursive equivalence through particularist categories 
(i.e., via nationalism and patriotism).  Thus, bordering activity that articulates difference 
in terms of national-political identities tends to achieve discursive equivalence more 
easily than other instances of bordering.  As a result, articulations of national-political 
identity make up the majority of the ensembled activity that is a border.  However, 
articulations of other forms of identity are coordinated in the ensemble as well, and these 
both shape and are shaped by the articulations of national-political identity.  Thus, the 
Mexico-US border is the ensemble of conscious and unconscious claims of particular 
subjects to be recognized as not only as Mexican or US citizens, but also as North 
American, Spanish-speaking, English-speaking, Latina, Caucasian, raised in the United 
                                                 
18 For a more technical elaboration of the notion of discursive equivalence I am employing, see the preface 
and third chapter of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (Laclau and Mouffe 2001).  Equivalence is not a 
relation that is prior or external to specific discursive articulations.    
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States, born in Chiapas, nationalistic, racist, atheist, Protestant, Catholic, Chicana, etc.  
The ensemble also includes the discursive acts of accepting, rejecting, differentiating and 
identifying with these claims.  Despite the diversity of the ensemble, articulations of 
national-political identity play the dominant role in the discursive life of the border; they 
exercise hegemony over other articulations within the ensembled bordering activity.19 
Geographic location is a central component of standard concepts of national 
borders, and any reconceptualization of borders must feature a homologous component.  
The present account analyzes geographic location in terms of discursive localization 
through the equivalence of particular articulations of difference.  Thus, the ensemble of 
discursive activity that is the Mexico-US border is localized by the patterned valence of 
equivalent acts, rather than the distribution of geographic space.20  Moreover, it is 
important to recall that, as Laclau and Mouffe have claimed, discourse includes the 
creation, arrangement and manipulation of material structures, inasmuch as these are 
socially constructed structures in addition to sheer physical presences (Laclau and 
Mouffe 2001, p. 108). Thus, the walls, fences, rivers, mountain ranges, checkpoints and 
welcome signs that make up the material life of borders are as much a part of the 
bordering discourse as are the hesitation, intolerance, welcoming acceptance, glares, 
prejudices and silencing with which subjects respond to identity claims.  Although acts of 
bordering are not always locatable in geographic space, the material elements of the 
bordering discourse are, and it is to these that we usually refer when we locate, for 
                                                 
19 The notion of hegemony that I intend is elaborated below, on pages 29-31, although in a different 
context.  There I discuss the hegemony that the ensemble as a whole exercises over a multiplicity of 
uncoordinated articulations of difference.  A homologous organization is present within the ensemble itself.  
20 This is confirmed by remarks by Balibar, Donnan and Wilson, and Paasi that all recognize the dispersion 
of borders throughout and across territories, in addition to their geographic concentration at the physical 
limits of sovereign territory (Balibar 2004; Donnan and Wilson 1998; Passi 2005a). 
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example, the Mexico-US border between the towns of El Paso and Ciudad Jáurez.  The 
Mexico-US border also exists, of course, in a dispersion of sites, from the physical 
immigration desks at J.F.K International Airport to wherever Mexican and US identity 
claims are negotiated, including fictional environments and cyberspace.  Thus, we should 
understand the geographic location of the border as shorthand for sites of densely 
coordinated discursive activity. 
Finally, because national borders are coordinated ensembles of discursive activity, 
rather than individual or independent things, no form of agency can be ultimately 
attributed to them.  Borders cannot actually be “agents of a state’s security and 
sovereignty,” nor can they be accurately described as “separating the self from the other,” 
distinguishing nations, constituting a people, defining a sphere of sovereignty or 
differentiating between the familiar and the alien (Donnan and Wilson 1998, p. 9; 
Newman 2006a, p. 177).  All of these claims must be analyzed as shorthand for the 
underlying truth that is revealed in the present account of borders-as-bordering: that the 
concrete subjects of the bordering discourse—persons, not institutions, objects or 
processes—are themselves the agents of the state that separate the self from other, 
distinguish nations, constitute peoples, define the range of sovereign authority and 
adjudicate between the familiar and the alien.  As bordering subjects, we—all of us—
perform these operations through our explicit and implicit identity claims, and through 
our conscious and unconscious responses to the identity claims of others.  The activities 
traditionally ascribed to national borders, then, are in fact never done for us by entities 
that mediate our interactions.  Nor are they the exclusive prerogative of authorities that 
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are sanctioned to legislate, administer, or enforce border operations.  Rather, borders—as 
acts of bordering—are done by us, to others, and vice versa. 
   
The analysis of borders in terms of bordering is now complete, and it shows that 
there exists a continuity between the phenomena of national borders and the everyday 
acts of inclusion, exclusion, identification and unification through which individuals and 
groups constitute their identities.  For example, there is a continuity between the 
bordering that occurs when the long-term residents of my neighborhood regard potential 
gentrifiers with suspicion, and the bordering that occurs when the citizens of my country, 
in order to preserve our current national self-image, lock down its southern border and 
turn away migrant workers.  In both cases, the identity of the community is reinforced 
through the acts of differentiation or exclusion with which it negotiates the identity 
claims of potential members.  Thus my neighbors, by sizing up newcomers and 
distinguishing between “us” and “them,” reinforce their real or ideal image of themselves 
as the Maxwell Heights community.  Likewise the citizens of the United States, by 
criminalizing the undocumented flow of labour into the nation’s area of sovereignty, 
reinforce a real or ideal image of the working ‘American’ and ‘American’ citizen.21  In 
short, because instances of bordering at any level involve the negotiation of two or more 
identities vis-à-vis articulations of difference, the ensembles of bordering activity that are 
national borders are continuous with the local or intimate acts with which individuals 
directly negotiate their personal and collective identities.   
                                                 
21 An excellent illustration of this is the explicit link between US immigration controls and the identity of 
the ‘American’ (i.e., US) middle class in the Federation for American Immigration Reform’s press release, 
“Bush Immigration Speech Calls for Same Old Illegal Alien Amnesty and Guest Worker Program, Says the 
Federation for American Immigration Reform,” April 9, 2007. Available at 
http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=media_release4092007.  Accessed 07/27/2007. 
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However, this continuity conflicts with common ways of speaking and thinking 
about national borders and, as indicated in section II, with theoretical analyses of state 
boundaries.  Borders do not seem to be of a kind with our quotidian negotiations of 
identity; they do not even seem to be the actions of particular subjects.  They seem like 
things, institutions or processes that are ontologically distinct from our own or anyone 
else’s bordering activity.  Moreover, in contrast to what I have said above, borders appear 
to be institutional agents that, in political contexts, perform bordering activity for us.  In 
other words, if indeed borders are our own actions, our agency is unrecognizable in them.   
In the next section, I will attempt to explain why national borders, but not other 
instances of bordering, appear as independent and agential things that exist between – and 
act upon—political subjects.  First, I argue that borders appear as if they are outside of 
the bordering discourse because of their hegemonic position within it.  Additionally I will 
suggest that processes of alienation, objectification and abstraction are responsible for the 
independent and agential appearance of national borders in theoretical and popular 
political discourse, as well as for the occlusion of the particular bordering activities of 
concrete subjects.  In the fifth and final section of this paper, I will argue that these 
processes are at the heart of the very modern relevance of state borders to our so-called 
postmodern age.  Before beginning these arguments, however, I will again develop the 
necessary theoretical concepts out of the work of other thinkers.  This time my sources 
are two surprisingly relevant philosophers of the birth and (potential) death of the modern 
state: Machiavelli and Marx.     
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The Unfinished Modernity of Bordered Life 
In The Prince, Machiavelli exhorts Lorenzo de’ Medici to unite the disparate 
population of feudal Italy into a singular and coherent “people.”  The population cannot 
unify itself; it must be interpellated as a collective political identity by an authority who 
appears to stand outside of it (Machiavelli 1998, p. 102-5).  The prince who would rule 
Italy, then, must be recognized as external to and independent of the mass of individuals 
that he transforms into a collective identity (Ibid p. 17, 55, 97).  The majority of 
Machiavelli’s text is dedicated to recommending how the prince might achieve this 
recognition by means of superiority and distinction founded upon “his own power and 
virtue” (Ibid p. 31).22 
However, Machiavelli constantly troubles the externality and independence of his 
prince, even as he stresses their importance.  In the Dedicatory Letter, he describes the 
separation of the prince from the vulgar as analogous to the position of a mountain over a 
valley—they are continuous with one another rather than absolutely distinct, and this 
continuity is the condition of each position (Ibid, p. 4).  Additionally, the same passage 
introduces a central theme of Machiavelli’s work: the prince is the constant object of the 
people’s regard and, because “men in general judge more by their eyes than by their 
hands,” ruling them will require manipulating their vision (Ibid, p. 70-1, 4, 87, 91).  
Indeed, the prince’s virtue is predominantly a manufactured semblance (Ibid 70-1).  More 
importantly, the prince’s power is only apparently his own.  Machiavelli repeatedly 
stresses that the prince’s dominion relies, not upon his own strength, but upon that of his 
subjects.  These particular subjects—the Italians who are themselves “superior in force, 
                                                 
22 The pairing of superiority and distinction is intentionally ambiguous: superiority suggests a continuity 
that must be the limit of distinction, and distinction suggests a difference that limits the significance of 
superiority.  A negotiation of these is central to the hegemonic relation Machiavelli theorizes. 
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dexterity and ingenuity”—constitute the prince's superiority by pledging allegiance to 
him, displacing their power (potenzia: potential, ability) to his person (Ibid, 102-4).  The 
prince is thus obligated to the masses for their power, and he must continually remain in 
their favor (Ibid, p. 18-9, 31-3, 37, 39, 40-2, 44, 55, 72, 79, 103).  Consequently, the 
prince’s apparent superiority and distinction—the manifestations of his externality and 
independence—are achieved only through his obligation to the population.  This 
undermines any actual externality or independence.  The prince is not external to the 
population, nor is he independent of it.  He is, rather, a privileged member of the 
population who, as a condition of this privilege, is dependent on the rest of the population 
for the image of his independence.  This is the truth that the vulgar must not realize if the 
prince’s interpellation of “the people” is to be effective.  
The fictive externality and independence of Machiavelli’s prince provides a 
schema that can be used to understand the apparent separation of political borders from 
other operations of bordering.  Machiavelli theorizes (and hopes to bring about) the 
transformation of a disparate multiplicity of agents into a coherent collective identity.  
This change is to be affected by a hegemonic agent who, through its relation to the 
subaltern multiplicity, is able to organize the latter into a unity.  The agent appears, by 
virtue of its hegemony, to be separate from, external to and independent of the 
multiplicity over which hegemony is exercised.  In fact, as Machiavelli subtly stresses, 
the multiplicity participates in the agent’s hegemony, and the agent participates in the 
multiplicity’s subalternity.  The agent is thus not external to the multiplicity, but occupies 
a hegemonic position within it.  Its apparent externality, however, is the condition and 
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consequence of its hegemony, which organizes the other elements of the multiplicity into 
a subaltern unity.   
The logic of hegemony present in Machiavelli’s thought indicates how some 
instances of bordering activity—national borders—can appear to be external to the 
entirety of the bordering discourse.  As explained above, a border is a coordinated 
ensemble of equivalent bordering operations within a multiplicity (or multiplicities) of 
uncoordinated acts of bordering.  The ensemble is distinguished from the rest of the 
multiplicity by virtue of its coordination and density (i.e., by virtue of the degree of 
equivalence and the number or frequency of ensembled equivalent acts).  The 
manifestation of this distinction is the dichotomous organization of the whole multiplicity 
along a central relation of hegemonic-subaltern (i.e., coordinated-uncoordinated), 
wherein the disparate bordering operations are all equally subaltern in their relation to the 
hegemonic ensemble.23  This organization has two primary effects.   
First, the hegemonic ensemble to some degree organizes the subaltern operations, 
not only around their equal subalternity, but also around equivalent acts of identification 
and differentiation.  In other words, borders motivate toward equivalence both the 
positions and the specific content of other bordering operations within multiplicities.  We 
might say that the hegemonic ensembles align the valence of the diverse subaltern 
                                                 
23 Importantly, the entirety of discourse is organized into many such dichotomies, some of which overlap or 
are nested within others.  There are, of course, a plurality of national borders, which sometimes overlap or 
nest (as in the case of embassies, diplomatic immunity and military bases).  It may be clarifying to think of 
the totality of discourse in terms of regions, wherein different hegemonic organizations occur.  I do not 
want to commit myself to this image, however, because I am wary of spatializing discourse, and I am even 
more hesitant to impose a geopolitical template onto a conceptualization of discourse itself.  I have opted to 
speak of “multiplicities” of varying sizes rather than regions, and I use the phrases “the entirety of 
discourse” or “the bordering discourse itself” to indicate the totality of multiplicities.  Borders organize 
multiplicities into relations of hegemonic-subaltern; they do not organize the entirety of the bordering 
discourse.  Nonetheless, their position within a hegemonically organized multiplicity makes them appear to 
be, not only separate from that multiplicity, but also something other than bordering activity—i.e., outside 
of the entirety of the bordering discourse.  
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articulations of difference.24  Crucially, this has the effect of reinforcing the hegemony of 
the ensemble; the border “grows” through the aligned participation of the organized 
subaltern bordering operations.   
Second, the bifurcated organization of the multiplicity into hegemonic and 
subaltern operations gives the appearance that the coordinated ensemble is separate from 
(i.e., external to and independent of) the diverse bordering activities that are organized 
around their equal subalternity.  This is because the subaltern operations appear to be the 
entirety of the multiplicity, while the ensemble, thanks to its hegemonic status within the 
multiplicity, appears to be external to it.  The particular hegemonic status of the 
ensemble, in relation to the equivalent status that pervades the multiplicity, gives the 
impression that it is not only outside the multiplicity but, moreover, that the ensemble is 
something other than the bordering operations that make up the multiplicity.  Thus, it 
appears to be outside of the bordering discourse itself.  In other words, national borders 
appear to the subjects of uncoordinated bordering activity just as the prince appears to the 
masses—as a superior and distinct agent that is involved in activity completely unlike 
their own.25    
In short, Machiavelli theorizes a relation of hegemony that enables us to 
understand the apparent externality of borders to the bordering discourse, not as a 
consequence of the commonly assumed thing-ness of borders, but as an effect of the 
organization of bordering activity itself.  However, in order to fully clarify the relation of 
borders to bordering, and to reconcile the present account with common understandings 
                                                 
24 As political geography and anthropology have shown, national borders have a strong influence on the 
social, political and economic identities of individuals who reside in borderlands, frontiers and even the 
interior of bordered territories (Douglas 1998; Jukarainen 2005; Paasi 1999, 2005a; Sahlins 1998; Villa 
2000). 
25 Regarding the pairing of “superior” and “distinct,” see note 22, above. 
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of borders, we need to also understand the apparent separation of national borders from 
the bordering subject.  Here, Machiavelli is of no help, as his work does not comprehend 
the separability of agent and act.  Thus, we need to move beyond Machiavelli, to Marx, 
who makes this separation central to his revolutionary political thought.   
   
 In his early work, Marx theorizes the separation of the worker from the product of 
her labor as a process of violent alienation.  Crucially, alienation is not simply a matter of 
expropriation.  Rather, Marx’s concept describes the way that, in a specific economic, 
social and political context, a worker’s own activity turns back against her:  
The alienation of the worker in his object means not only that his labour 
becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside him, 
independently, as a something alien to him, and that it becomes a power of 
its own confronting him; it means that the life which he has conferred on 
the object confronts him as something hostile and alien (Marx 1978c, p. 
72). 
 
This confrontation is not the result of anything particular to the form of labor or the 
product itself.  Rather, it is a necessary effect of the capitalist organization of life, in 
which the worker becomes steadily poorer relative to the wealth she produces for others.  
Importantly, productive activity itself is also alienated from the worker: “If then the 
product of labour is alienation, production itself must be active alienation, the alienation 
of activity, the activity of alienation” (Ibid, p. 73).  In other words, the act itself is 
separated from the agent; it is “external” to her, it “neither depends on nor belongs to” 
her, and it bears no trace of her particular agency (Ibid, p. 74-5).  Alienated activity thus 
confronts the subject who begets it as independent, subject-less activity. 
 In his later work, Marx develops the concept of alienation into a new account of 
objectification, which describes the apparent transformation of active social relations into 
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“objects [that] are independent of the workers whom they dominate” (Marx 1990, p. 
1054).  For Marx, social relationality is a mode of activity, and social relations are not 
hypostatized relationships, but the active interactions of social subjects. 26  
Objectification, then, transforms an activity or mode of activity into an independent, 
autonomous thing.  Marx writes: 
The social character of activity, as well as the social form of the product, 
and the share of individuals in production here appear as something alien 
and objective, confronting the individuals, not as their relation to one 
another, but as their subordination to relations which subsist independently 
of them and which arise out of the collisions between mutually indifferent 
individuals (Marx 1973, p. 157) 
 
Through objectification, sociality itself—no matter whether it is manifested in the social 
nature of an activity, product or person—appears as “something alien to them, 
autonomous, as a thing” (Ibid).  Whereas alienated social activity confronts individuals 
as a subject-less process, objectified social activity confronts them as an autonomous 
subject, capable of acting on other things and, in particular, capable of actively 
oppressing the concrete subject whose reified sociality it is. 
Importantly, the objectification of sociality does not leave the social subject 
unchanged.  Rather, it appears to strip the subject of her social agency.  Thus, the 
separation of activity and agent via objectification is a double movement.  On the one 
hand, it transforms the agent’s sociality into an apparently independent thing, capable of 
acting on its own and even dominating the agent.  On the other hand, it transforms the 
agent herself into an asocial non-agent, one of the “mutually indifferent individuals” who 
collide rather than interact (Ibid).  Thus, objectification is both the “personification of 
things and the reification [Versachlichung] of persons” (Marx 1990, p. 1054).  It is, in 
                                                 
26 Thus, in the passage from the Grundrisse quoted below, the relation of individuals to one another—i.e., 
their active interactions—appear as relations between them—i.e., inactive and independent things. 
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short, a separation of agent and activity that displaces social agency from the former to 
the latter. 
The concepts of alienation and objectification can be used to explain the apparent 
separation of national borders—as instances of bordering activity—from the subjects of 
that activity.  The latter concept also makes sense of the apparent thing-ness and agency 
of borders.27 As alienated or objectified instances of bordering activity, borders appear to 
be anonymous and autonomous processes or things that confront the subjects who 
ultimately engender them.  In the latter case, they also appear to monopolize the activity 
of bordering, doing the work of separating, distinguishing and constituting political 
identities and communities themselves.  Thus, in their confrontation with objectified 
bordering activity, bordering subjects appear as bordered subjects, whose communities 
and identities are the products of asocial, agential, impersonal and independent 
institutions, rather than the dynamic outcomes of their own activity. 
This analysis of borders as alienated or objectified bordering activity is very 
similar to Marx’s early critiques of the modern state, the details of which will complete 
the present exploration of the apparent separation of borders from the bordering subject.  
In his critique of The Philosophy of Right, Marx famously inverts Hegel’s claim that the 
state, as a stage in the development of the ideal subject of history, produces the family 
and civil society through its own activity.  Lambasting Hegel’s idealism, Marx writes, 
“Family and civil society constitute themselves as the state.  They are the driving force…  
                                                 
27 The concept of alienation can be used to explain the way borders are conceived by neotraditional 
geopolitical theories: as the alienated bordering activity of concrete subjects, borders appear as 
independent, subject-less processes that occur between and mediate the interactions of individuals and 
groups.  The concept of objectification can be used to explain the way borders are conceived by traditional 
geopolitical theories and popular discourse: as the objectified activity of concrete subjects, borders appear 
as independent, agential things that stand between and act upon individuals and groups. 
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The fact is that the state issues from the multitude…  As if the actual state were not the 
people.  The state is an abstraction. The people alone are what is concrete” (Marx 1978a, 
p. 17-8).  The state, as the objectified activity of the concrete multitude, presents itself as 
an independent sphere of universal subjectivity over and against civil society, which is 
reduced to the sphere of particular subjects.  As with Machiavelli's prince, this 
independence is only apparent.  The state in fact requires and presupposes the private 
sphere, inasmuch as its image of universality can only be manifested in opposition to the 
particularity of concrete individuals and their actions (Marx 1978b, p. 33).   
However, Marx goes beyond Machiavelli by theorizing the way in which the 
state—as an abstraction—obscures the concrete activity out of which it arises.28  Whereas 
the prince’s person and station exude particularity in the form of perceived distinction 
and apparent superiority, the state legislates such particularity away from itself “when it 
decrees that birth, social rank, education, occupation are non-political distinctions; when 
it proclaims… that every member of society is an equal partner in popular sovereignty” 
(Ibid).  Because hegemony is no longer based on an image of particularity, but on an 
aspiration toward universality, the state presents itself as a community in which all are 
equal participants.  However, this constant profession of universality hides the fact that 
the state is ultimately the objectified activity of concrete, particular subjects.  The state 
stands over this concrete particularity as an abstract community, and subjects participate 
in it—indeed, they depend upon it—only as abstract, legal citizens, rather than as 
                                                 
28 Abstraction and the issue of universality are modern phenomena not found in monarchical regimes, 
wherein the sovereign is concrete and hegemony is explicitly predicated upon particularity (i.e., the 
prince’s appearance, his virtue, his legacy of deeds, etc).  In such regimes, the subalterns misrecognize the 
particular hegemonic element as completely unlike them.  In modern states, in the presence of a universal 
hegemonic element, they misrecognize themselves. 
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particular individuals (Ibid, p. 34).  Thus, the “abstraction of the state as such” and “the 
abstraction of private life” are concurrent in modern society (Marx 1978a, p. 22).29   
This double abstraction not only hides the antagonistic particularity from which 
the state arises, it also conceals the particular antagonisms that remain active beneath and 
even through the state’s fictive universality.  On one hand, the banishment of conflictual 
particularity to the private sphere ensures the necessity and the legitimation of the state as 
a space of neutrality over and above civil society.  On the other hand, it ensures that the 
state cannot actually play this role, as the dominant elements of civil society also 
dominate the state apparatus, aided by its pretenses of universality (Marx 1978b, p. 33-4; 
Marx 1978d, p. 187).  In short, the abstract nature of the modern state obscures the 
actions of concrete individuals while transforming the objectified activity of all into the 
hegemony of some. 
Borders share the pretense to universality manifested in the entirety of the state 
apparatus.  They too function as abstractions, eschewing particularity in their operations 
by aspiring to be unprejudiced, objective processes.  In doing so, they force a kind of 
abstraction upon the subjects who interact with them—each is viewed only as an actual or 
potential community member, a citizen or non-citizen, or the holder of a domestic or 
foreign passport, rather than a concrete person.  As abstractions, borders occlude the 
bordering discourse of which they are a part and disavow their condition as the alienated 
and objectified interactions of concrete subjects.  Thus, the social, subjective and 
thoroughly particular activity of articulating difference, as well as the concrete subjects of 
                                                 
29 Etienne Balibar puts this clearly: “The universalization of particularity is the compensation for the 
constitution of the State, a fictive community whose power of abstraction compensates for the real lack of 
community between individuals” (Balibar 1995, p. 48).  It must be remembered that, for Marx, the “real 
lack of community” is an effect of the capitalist organization of life and, in particular, the state’s sanction 
of this organization in civil society. 
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bordering activity, are concealed by the appearance that borders negotiate identity 
themselves.  Nonetheless, particularity continues to operate, deviously and powerfully, in 
the social interactions covered over by the abstract institution, including those that occur 
through or in the name of the institution itself.30  
   
As philosophers of the birth and (potential) death of the modern state, Machiavelli 
and Marx provide the intellectual foundations necessary to understand the central 
institution of territorial sovereignty without reference to political-geographical 
territoriality.  In section III, I theorized borders as operations of bordering activity 
continuous with the everyday acts of social bordering performed by social subjects.  This 
continuity, I suggested, conflicts with common understandings of borders as agential 
things that exist and operate independently of the activity of bordering subjects.  In this 
section, I have drawn from Machiavelli to argue that national borders are indeed 
articulations of difference within the bordering discourse; however, thanks to their 
hegemonic status within this discourse, they appear to be external to it.  Thus, while 
borders appear to be different from the everyday activity of bordering with which we 
constitute our individual and collective identities, they are in fact the most successful 
instances of this activity.   
Drawing from Marx, I have proposed that national borders are alienated and 
objectified instances of bordering activity.  As such, the social character of this activity 
has been obscured, and the activity itself appears as a border-object separate from the 
individuals who originally performed it.  Moreover, the agential autonomy endowed by 
                                                 
30 In different ways, Gloria Anzaldúa, Nevzat Soguk and Pablo Villa vividly illustrate the complicated 
weave of universality and particularity in both the transgression and enforcement of the Mexico-US border 
(Anzaldúa 1999; Soguk 1996; Villa 2000).    
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objectification creates the impression that borders act upon these individuals, defining 
their communities and collective identities for them.  Finally, I have proposed that 
borders function as abstractions that obscure their origins in the articulations of difference 
performed by concrete bordering subjects, thereby concealing their own status as 
hegemonic, alienated, objectified and abstracted activity.  This allows them to covertly 
privilege the particular bordering operations of some concrete subjects while overtly 
aspiring to the equal treatment of all.  For all of these reasons, we commonly think, speak 
and act as if borders are things that we can act upon, and which act upon us, rather than 
things we do. 
Throughout this discussion, I have put significant stress on the notions of 
appearance and semblance, arguing that borders are not what they seem—or, more 
faithfully, that they seem what they are not—as if being and seeming could be easily 
untangled.  In the present context, they can be untangled, but not easily.  Despite major 
differences, my analysis shares with neotraditional geopolitical theories the broad claim 
that national borders are, one way or another, effects of discursive activity.  This implies 
that there is no extra-discursive essence of borders; they really are what they are in 
discourse—that is, in the linguistic, behavioral, ideal and material practices and 
interactions of social subjects.   
This does not mean that borders are necessarily only what they appear to some or 
all subjects; the discursive life of borders is not exhausted by the ways that subjects 
explicitly and consciously understand, talk about, or intentionally act toward them.  
Nonetheless, the ways that borders appear to subjects—and the ways that subjects, in 
relation to borders, appear to themselves—have inestimable impact on the organization of 
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social discourse.  Thus, the ways that borders appear are a significant part of what is real 
about them, and, more broadly, about bordered life.  Theodor Adorno puts the general 
point very well when he writes, “Yet such pure appearance is the ens realissimum in the 
immediate life of men.  The force of gravity of social relationships serves only to 
strengthen that appearance more and more” (Adorno 1969, p. 151-2).  Appearance, on 
Adorno’s account and mine, is neither unreal nor wrong; it is not an illusion to be 
dispelled.  Rather, through its supremely powerful influence in the organization of life, 
appearance is woven into—and continues to weave itself into—the social fabric that is 
reality. 
Thus, in opposing the way borders appear with a new account of what they are, I 
do not expect to negate, dispel or disprove their appearance.  Nor do I mean to trivialize 
it.  Rather, I mean to indicate that, even in social discourse, that which appears does not 
exhaust all that is real.  Thus, the critical intent of my project has not been to replace 
appearance with reality, but to uncover social forces, practices and ways of being that are 
obscured by that which appears, but which nevertheless shape reality and the ways it is 
lived.  In other words, my claims about borders—the ways they appear and what they 
are—are not intended to be either purely descriptive or purely corrective.  They are meant 
to be diagnostic.   
The ways that national borders appear in theoretical and everyday discourse can 
be read as symptoms of alienation, objectification and abstraction at work in our ways of 
understanding and living life in common.  Orienting the analyses of borders and 
bordering this way, we can return to the questions raised at the end of section II.  There, 
the inadequacy of neotraditional theories was revealed in their failure to account for an 
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asymmetry between, on the one hand, intuitive understandings of collective negotiations 
of national-political identity and, on the other, those of individual negotiations of social 
identity.  The asymmetry can now be accounted for: alienation, objectification and 
abstraction affect the bordering of national-political identities more so than they affect 
that of other forms of identity.  To put it differently, the above analyses have revealed 
that the articulation of difference in terms of national-political identity is alienated, 
objectified and abstracted in ways that other articulations of difference are not.  Thus, the 
thing-ness of the border-object seems appropriate to negotiations of national-political 
collective identity, but not to other forms of bordering. 
This indicates that alienation, objectification and abstraction are not intrinsic to 
the activity of bordering itself.  Rather, they are an effect of social discourse more 
broadly, i.e., of a particular arrangement of social conditions and ways of living.  Thus, 
the reason that these processes affect the bordering of national-political identity, rather 
that of other forms of identity, can only be found in the particular makeup of actual social 
discourse, just as Marx could only explain the specificity of alienated industrial labor by 
examining capitalist society more generally.   
At this point, then, the present analyses of borders and bordering opens up to a 
deeper and broader question for further diagnosis: What is it about our social lives and 
social selves such that the processes of alienation, objectification and abstraction have 
come to operate in our discursive treatment of national borders specifically, and, more 
broadly, in our ways of understanding and negotiating national-political identities?  In 
other words, having identified symptoms of these processes in common ways of 
conceptualizing and living bordered life, the diagnosis can inquire as to their origins.  
 43 
What is it about ourselves and society, we might ask, that is responsible for the 
alienation, objectification and abstraction of our national-political bordering activity? 
The present inquiry is not the occasion to attempt an answer to the questions it has 
just posed.  Understanding the causes of these processes would require extensive 
sociological, historical, psychological, psychoanalytic, political scientific and discourse 
analytic investigations that I am not prepared to undertake.  However, the diagnostic 
endeavor can take another critical track, by further elaborating what is at stake in the 
processes that it has revealed.  Rather than looking backward for causes, in the final 
section of this paper I will begin where the foregoing analyses conclude—with a 
recognition of the facticity of alienation, objectification and abstraction—and inquire as 
to the further impact and influence of these processes on our social selves and social 
lives.  The conclusions of this inquiry will finally enable a reformulation and resolution 
to the question of the obsolescence of national borders in contemporary global life.    
 
The Suppression of the Subject and the Contemporary Function of Borders 
Thus far, the aim of my paper has been to show that national borders are 
ensembles of bordering activity—the discursive articulation of difference—that do not 
appear as such, thanks to processes of alienation, objectification and abstraction that have 
separated this activity from other operations of bordering and, most importantly, from the 
bordering subjects themselves.  These processes do not affect all bordering activity; they 
are generally limited to that which articulates difference in terms of two or more national-
political identities.  Moreover, alienation, objectification and abstraction are not isolated 
distortions of consciousness, but are, as I have suggested, the material effects of a 
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specific organization of social life and the way it is lived by social subjects.  As such, 
they in turn deeply affect the structures of society and social lives.   
The most significant effect of these processes is the eclipse of concrete bordering 
subjects by the anonymous, autonomous and abstract institution of national borders in the 
discursive negotiation of national-political identities.  Where two or more such identities 
interact, this interaction appears as the mediation of multiple fixed collective identities by 
the borders between them, rather than the actively creative discursive interplay of social 
subjects.  In such cases—cases where the nation has the most at stake in the articulation 
of difference—the concrete subjects of bordering are thus occluded by their own 
alienated, objectified and abstracted activity. 
Crucially, this means that the concrete, particular subject of bordering is excluded 
from the creation, maintenance and manipulation of the national-political identity with 
which she identifies or in which she participates.  In other words, due to the alienation, 
objectification and abstraction revealed by the foregoing analysis, the articulation of 
national-political identities occurs by means of a suppression of the concrete subjects 
whose life-activity in fact structures—and is deeply structured by—these identities.  This 
suppression has at least three very important consequences that help explain the persistent 
relevance of borders in contemporary global society. 
First, the suppression of the concrete subject of bordering activity entails that 
neither the negotiation of national-political identity, nor the determination of community 
membership, can take place through a robustly democratic process.  This is because 
national borders articulate difference at a level of abstraction which can admit neither the 
particular bordering acts, nor the particular bordered identities, of concrete individuals.  
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Thus, the collective political identity of ‘the people’ cannot be given content by the 
particular people themselves.  
This is, of course, a familiar problem as regards the initiation of popular 
sovereignty.  As Ivor Jennings famously puts it, “The doctrine of self-determination… 
seemed reasonable: let the people decide.  It was in fact ridiculous because the people 
cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people” (Jennings 1958, p. 56).31  The 
sentiment behind Jennings’s remark is a bit of political wisdom that emerged with the 
modern state, and I have already introduced it in the discussion of Machiavelli: “the 
people” of a polity is originally constituted through the undemocratic act of 
differentiating, or being differentiated by, an external other.  Thus, even a democratic 
polity begins with a moment of undemocratic foundation. 
However, in the present context, the problem is much more persistent.  Despite 
the alienation, objectification and abstraction of the activity of particular bordering 
subjects, the constitution of collective political identities remains a perpetual process of 
articulation; it is not limited to a particular moment of founding.  Because the agents of 
this ongoing articulation are abstract institutions rather than concrete individuals, and 
because the alienated and objectified articulatory process cannot reflect the activity of 
these individuals, the postponement of the popular determination of collective identity is 
also perpetual.  The moment of undemocratic foundation endures as long as national 
identity is negotiated through national borders rather than by the bordering subjects 
themselves. 
                                                 
31 Cited in Dahbour 2005.  Dahbour applies this problem to the democratic determination of national 
borders, although not as I conceive them.  In the terms of my account, his investigation remains at the level 
of abstraction and fails to recognize the constant negotiation of political identity that occurs beneath the 
discourse of border politics. 
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It is important to notice that efforts to democratize the institution of borders 
cannot recapture the democratic potential lost in the suppression of the concrete 
bordering subject.  Even if the legislation and administration of borders were made 
answerable to a deeply democratic process, as Étienne Balibar and others advocate, this 
process would only democratize the operations of an abstraction, thus perpetuating the 
alienation of bordering activity from its concrete subjects (Balibar 2004, p. 101-114).32  If 
the determination of collective political identity is to be rendered democratic, then the 
articulation of difference must be made democratic at its most basic level.  This requires, 
as a first step, the retrieval of the suppressed subjects of bordering. 
The second consequence of the suppression of the concrete bordering subjects is 
the concealment of the subjective bases which motivate the acts of inclusion, exclusion, 
identification and differentiation necessary to the articulation of political identity.  As 
long as the negotiation of national-political identities occurs through the institutional 
mediation of claims to citizenship, rather than through the direct discursive interaction of 
particular individuals and groups, the affects, dispositions, prejudices and experiences 
which ultimately inform this negotiation go unrecognized.  Thus, the abstraction that 
suppresses the concrete subjects of bordering also suppresses the most powerful forces 
informing a community’s sense of self.  Effectively, this renders the community opaque 
                                                 
32 Despite much affinity in our political analyses, Balibar calls for deeply democratic reforms that 
obviously preserve national borders as reified objects of administration and agents of social differentiation, 
rather than acknowledging the bordering activity of individuals and urging a retrieval of the bordering 
subject: “What can be done, in today’s world, to democratize the institution of the border, that is, to put it 
at the service of men and submit it to their collective control, make it an object of their ‘sovereignty,’ rather 
than allowing it to subject them to powers over which they have no control…  The task of democratizing 
borders—which implies that their representation be desacralized, that the way the state and administration 
use them with respect to individuals becomes the object of a multilateral control, and that the rites and 
formalities of crossing them become more respectful of fundamental rights—is at the heart of these 
difficulties, and perhaps, at present, the aporias, of a reinvention of politics in the context of 
‘globalization’” (Balibar 2004, p. 108, 114) 
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to itself, making self-understanding impossible and exempting the subjective bases of its 
political identification from any kind of critical inquiry.  Nonetheless, these forces 
continue to operate invisibly, beneath the abstraction which masks them and, in the case 
of subjective motivations that can be duplicitously construed as universal, even through 
the abstraction.33  Through the institution of borders, in other words, a community can 
legislate, enforce or otherwise realize subjective motives for inclusion and exclusion, or 
identification and differentiation, that it cannot even admit to itself.  
This last possibility has long been recognized by critics who maintain that 
immigration controls and borders themselves are mechanisms for the institutional 
enforcement and official legitimation of racism (Hayter 2004, No One is Illegal! 2003).  
It is again important to realize that, if this is the case, attempts to ameliorate the situation 
via the reform or abolition of institutions remain at the level of abstraction and thus fail to 
address the concrete problem.  Opening borders and abolishing immigration controls will 
not eliminate racism or its official sanction and, as history has repeatedly shown, these 
will likely find new and possibly more devious avenues of operation.  Again, addressing 
the problems manifested by borders requires a return to, and a return of, the suppressed 
subjects of bordering.    
                                                 
33 This is true not only for the institutional operations of national borders, but also for the way that borders 
functions in political rhetoric as a trope for the threatened, defended, open or closed homogeneity to which 
national-political identity aspires.  See, for instance, President Bush’s remark from June 2007: "Securing 
the border and upholding family values are not partisan concerns” (Babington 2007).  A more vivid 
illustration of the linkage of border politics and ‘American’ identity is provided by the televised remarks of 
Dan Stein, a representative of the organization Federation for American Immigration Reform:  “What they 
[groups funded by the Ford Foundation] want is a complete absence of US immigration controls, 
particularly the US/Mexico border.  Their strategy has been to create a hollow core strategy where the 
Border Patrol just becomes this thin line around the US perimeter…  Well, underneath the surface of all 
these groups is a radical political agenda led by a group called MECHA, which works to re-establish this 
mythical Chicano state called Aztlan.  It -- it's based on the idea that the US is stolen territory…  Through 
the stream of all of this is a streak of anti-Western bias.  MALDEF also works to rewrite American 
history... challenging Texas's rendition of the Alamo, for example” (Federation for American Immigration 
Reform 2003). 
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Finally, the suppression of the bordering subjects creates a space of potential 
contradiction between the abstract politics of borders on the one hand, and the concrete 
activity of bordering performed by particular subjects on the other.  As discussed above, 
the pretenses to universality present in the operations of national borders, as in Marx’s 
state, conceal and suppress the potentially antagonistic articulation of particularity by 
concrete subjects.  Nonetheless, this articulation does not cease; rather, it potentially 
grows more intense in the shadows of abstract universality.  This accounts for the implicit 
compatibility between two seemingly contrary modes of constructing a political 
community and negotiating its identity: on the one hand, a national or regional 
commitment to open borders and inclusive citizenship, and, on the other hand, the 
continuation of local or intimate acts of violent exclusion.  This compatibility is 
illustrated by the development of the European Union, where a remapping of local 
prejudices, nationalist ideology, and racial antagonism has attended the opening of its 
internal borders.  Naturally, abstract border politics need not be inclusive, and concrete 
acts of bordering need not be exclusive.  However, as long as the latter remain suppressed 
by the former, the national-political self remains susceptible to a constitutive split that 
cannot be resolved from within the perspective of abstraction alone. 
The gap between abstract articulations of national-political identity and the 
bordering activity of concrete subjects can be an especially precarious place for ethnic 
minorities and, in particular, refugees.  Such persons are often admitted through borders 
as ciphers bearing human rights, only to be excluded from more narrow articulations of 
national collective identity because of their real, perceived or fictionally ascribed claims 
to particularity.  Thus, any satisfactorily deep “ethics of immigration,” cannot simply 
 49 
conclude that “policies of fairly open borders... are feasible and urgently required for the 
sake of humanity,” without also addressing the exclusivity of national communities at the 
level of concrete negotiations of collective identity (Bader 2007, p. 354).  Once again, 
mending bordered life requires more than perforating borders; it requires penetrating 
abstraction itself to recover the suppressed bordering subjects.  
Returning to the suppressed subjects of bordering would mean to examining the 
everyday bordering activity of actual, particular, concrete individuals and groups, as well 
as recognizing that the agency often attributed to national borders is a displacement of 
this activity.  It would mean acknowledging that borders, as they are commonly 
understood, cannot function without this displacement.  Thus, it would mean recognizing 
the complicity of concrete persons in the boundedness of their lives in common, in the 
constant operations of exclusion and inclusion that define their communities, and in the 
acts of identification and differentiation that determine their collective selves.  Most 
importantly, it would mean recognizing that such complicity is enacted, not through the 
conscious delegation of bordering activity to an institutional apparatus, but through a 
continual abnegation of agency that is induced by processes of alienation, objectification 
and abstraction at work in the organization of social life and in the subject herself.  Only 
by working against these processes, and restoring the concrete subject as the agent of 
national-political bordering, could the negotiation of collective political identity possibly 
be rendered democratic, self-conscious, accessible to critique and responsive to more 
intimately particular acts of identification and differentiation. 
This task suggests future directions for political theory, psychoanalysis, 
philosophy and social theory—directions that all lead from borders to bordering.  
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Ironically, by working to retrieve the concrete subject of collective national identity 
formation, these so-called “soft” disciplines are uniquely suited to offer an important 
corrective to “hard” disciplines, such as geopolitics and international relations, which fail 
to see the abstraction at work in the concept and the institution of the border.  Rather than 
outlining what such collaboration might look like, however, I want to conclude by 
returning to the sense of anachronism that originally motivated this paper. 
   
As discussed above, the global nature of social and political trends stands, in the 
view of many, in direct contrast to the useful functioning of national borders.  The 
relationships of interiority and exteriority, domestic and foreign, and familiar and 
unfamiliar that borders were once supposed to establish have lost any pretense to 
exclusivity, and the borders themselves constitute neither containers of political power 
nor areas of exclusive dominion.  Persons, goods, information, organizational structures, 
ideas, culture, and identities transgress and transcend national borders every moment, as 
do violence, disease, famine and environmental destruction.  In other words, the widest-
reaching social, political and economic affairs of our contemporary world, along with its 
most powerful actors, have become progressively deterritorialized. 
This global reconfiguration of power and problems indicates that, indeed, the 
sovereign territorial ideal has reached it limit.  Sovereignty cannot retain its tight 
attachment to territory if it is to remain a meaningful and desirable political good in the 
21st century.  Nor can physical territory remain “an essentially defining feature” of the 
state if the latter is to remain capable of administering its own affairs (Weber 2004, p. 
33).  The ideal of territorial sovereignty is thus inadequate to the contemporary political 
world.   
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Inasmuch as this fading ideal was once the necessary condition and original 
animating principle of national borders, these institutions linger as anachronisms in 
contemporary global affairs.  The world has changed such that, when borders do 
successfully perform the territorial functions ascribed to them by modern political 
thought, their operations appear to many as the mechanisms of “simple provincialism,” 
rather than the “the sine qua non for global stability” that they were once considered to be 
(Maus 2006, p. 466; Murphy 1996, p. 83).  The “provincial” territoriality inconsistently 
enforced by national borders, once held as the summum bonum of state power, is now 
often viewed as an obstacle to political affairs.  Consequently, national borders, as 
institutions of the outmoded sovereign territorial ideal, stand in an anachronistic relation 
to contemporary deterritorialized life. 
The obsolescence of national borders, however, cannot be implied from their 
anachronism.  Although they instantiate an outmoded ideal, borders may perform 
functions in contemporary society separate from those linked to the maintenance of 
territorial sovereignty.34  Or again, they may have always performed important functions 
other than their explicitly legitimating purposes.  To forget these possibilities is to equate 
the actual functioning of the institution with its modern ideal, and from here it is an easy 
and common misstep to expect the former to fade with the latter. 
Over the course of this paper, my theorization of national borders has gradually 
shifted away from their modern conceptualization and, in particular, its emphasis on 
territoriality.  In section II, I complicated traditional, modern geopolitical views of 
                                                 
34 Nevak Soguk’s Foucaultian analyses of the Mexico-US border makes this point excellently.  He argues 
that the US enforcement of the border does not, for the most part, effectively prohibit migrant workers from 
entering the state; it does, however, constitute a border-crossing experience that disciplines successful 
crossers into an underground economy that demands hard work, ingenuity, self-reliance and personal 
sacrifice in exchange for little reward (Soguk 1996).  
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borders with a loosely postmodern recognition of their discursive life, and I rejected 
neotraditional views for implicitly preserving the central conventions of their 
predecessors.  In section III, I theorized borders as the activity of concrete social subjects, 
thereby inverting the genetic structure of the geopolitical views and attempting to 
overturn the subordination of subjects to space that is central to the ideal of territorial 
sovereignty.  In section VI, I relied upon two thinkers from the beginning and end of 
modernity to develop the concepts that, in section V, I used to indicate new ways in 
which, independent of space or territory, the institution of borders indicates a 
subordination—this time a full-fledged suppression—of the subject.  In short, my effort 
to rethink national borders has progressed in a double movement: away from the modern 
emphasis on territoriality, while, simultaneously, toward a recognition of the 
subordination of the bordering subject by the institution that once best served that 
territoriality. 
At the end of this reconsideration, its two trajectories can be brought together to 
reformulate the question of the obsolescence of national borders in a way that avoids 
conflating the institution with its ideal.  Instead of asking whether the institutions of 
sovereign territoriality have been rendered useless by deterritorialization, we can ask 
whether borders —as alienated, objectified activity, as abstractions, and as 
anachronisms— have been made obsolete by contemporary economic, social and 
political affairs.  The reformulated question contains its solution.  The answer is no.  The 
original animating ideal of national borders may be on the decline, but their place in the 
globalizing world is assured, for the time being, by their role in the suppression of the 
concrete bordering subject.  This is their contemporary function, or, at least one of them. 
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As the alienated, objectified and abstract bordering activity of concrete 
individuals and groups, borders ensure that determinations and negotiations of national-
political identity are, in a very real way, out of the hands of the particular members of 
national-political communities.  Because of this, the national-political identity in which 
concrete persons participate exists as something over and above them, from which they 
can draw meaning, but to which they cannot contribute with their own bordering activity, 
except insofar as this activity is separated from them, anonymized and reified into an 
abstract concept of “the people” which cannot admit the particular subjects out of which 
it originates.  I have already discussed what I take to be three significant consequences of 
this suppression; it remains only to examine its relation to the eclipse of modern 
territoriality. 
   
By suppressing the bordering subject from the determination of collective 
political identity, the alienation, objectification and abstraction at work in national 
borders retain a crucial function of the sovereign territorial ideal, even in an increasingly 
deterritorializing or post-territorial world.  According to the early modern ideal of 
sovereignty, ruling over a people was an effect of ruling over a territory; territory defined 
“the people” over which sovereignty was exercised.  This continued throughout the late 
modern period as well, as territory remained, for the most part, the determining basis of 
“the people” in whom popular sovereignty was located.35  Now, ideally, no one ruled over 
                                                 
35 See note 4, above.  For this reason, I take issue with Ingebord Maus’s recent claim that “The transition to 
the democratic nation-state was defined precisely by the fact that the territorial principle as a whole was 
replaced by that of an association of persons… the national identity of socialized people can no longer be 
defined by the territory in which they live” (Maus 2006, p. 467).  As a reading of Kant, I can find no fault 
in Maus’s claim.  As a claim about the nation-state, it neglects the fact that the “association of persons” was 
itself often defined in terms of territory.  Nonetheless, Maus’s overall argument against the obsolescence of 
the nation-state is excellent, and it stands out as a major influence on my own, different, conclusions. 
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the subjects but themselves; however, the constitution of the community and its political 
identity could not be democratic, as this constitution necessarily preceded the demos of 
democracy.  Territoriality thus remained the original criterion for the definition of the 
collective political subject.  Even in the 20th century, territoriality remained the original 
determinant of the national-political identities of emergent polities.  The famous Ivor 
Jennings remark quoted above (page 43) refers, not to the formation of European states in 
the 18th-19th centuries, but to the decolonization of their holdings following World War II.  
Here again, the territorial determination of collective political selves necessarily preceded 
the development of self-determination. 
Territoriality, in short, has played a significant historical role in the necessarily 
heteronymous initial interpellations of collective political identity.  As such, it has filled 
the empty position theorized by Machiavelli in The Prince, and it has been a powerful 
tool for actual princes—colonial powers, ethno-national leaders, and revolutionaries—to 
shape and control the membership and collective identities of political communities prior 
to their capacity for self-determination or self-definition.  Seen from this perspective, 
territory has not been so much a defining limit of sovereign power, as it is conceived in 
Weber’s definition of the state, but as mechanism for gaining and exercising power.  
 In his book Human Territoriality, geographer Robert Sack generalizes this last 
point, defining territoriality as “a powerful geographic strategy to control people and 
things by controlling area” (Sack 1986, p. 5).  He lists several tendencies of territoriality, 
the basic tenor of which should be familiar: 
3.  Territoriality can be the most efficient strategy of enforcing control… 
4.  Territoriality provides a means of reifying power.   
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5.  Territoriality can be used to displace attention from the relationship 
between the controller and the controlled to the territory… territory 
appears as the agent doing the controlling. 
6.  By classifying at least in part by area rather than by kind or type, 
territoriality helps make relationships impersonal. 
7.  …Territory appears as a general, neutral, essential means by which a 
place is made… (Sack 1986, p. 32-3; original emphasis) 
 
Territoriality, I have suggested, has functioned historically as a mechanism for the 
heteronymous and undemocratic formation of collective political identity; Sacks’s work 
elaborates this function, stressing the displacing, anonymizing, objectifying and 
neutralizing tendencies of this mechanism.  The historical function of territoriality thus 
appears to be homologous to the contemporary role of borders, once borders are 
understood as the alienated, objectified and abstract bordering activity of concrete 
subjects, and once their contemporary function is understood as the suppression of those 
subjects from the determination of their own collective political identities.      
 This homology clarifies the relation between territoriality and the contemporary 
role of national borders.  As the former becomes an increasingly less viable strategy of 
power in a progressively deterritorialized world, the latter has come to take its place.  The 
undemocratic, heteronymous interpellation of a national-political identity persists, after 
the sovereign territorial ideal, in that ideal’s primary institution.  National borders—as the 
alienated, objectified and abstracted political identity negotiations of concrete subjects—
thus import a very modern dynamic into today’s allegedly postmodern world.  By 
suppressing the concrete subjects of bordering from the determination of their own 
collective identities, the discursive function of national borders continues the work of 
Machiavelli’s sovereign, by undemocratically interpellating “a people” via the alienation 
of its particular members.  Thus, borders preserve the modern political logic whereby the 
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constitution of a political community and its identity is prior to, and untouched by, 
popular sovereignty. 
However, this political logic has not simply been held over, unchanged, from 
modernity; rather, in its transition from the territorial ideal to the borders that once served 
this ideal, the heteronymous interpellation of the collective political subject has been 
post-modernized.  As discussed above, the constant articulatory activity of national 
borders ensures that the heteronymous, undemocratic founding of the political 
community persists, continually, as long as the bordering activity of concrete subjects is 
alienated, objectified and abstracted to the border institution.  Moreover, the 
interpellation is no longer restrictively spatialized; as the above analyses indicate, the 
alienation of bordering activity is not limited to particular geographic areas, but occupies 
a diversity of discursive space.  Thus, it occurs in the ‘interiors’ as well as the ‘frontiers’ 
of nation-states, throughout their dispersed or concentrated constituent populations.  In 
short, the moment of heteronymous, undemocratic interpellation is both perpetual and 
pervasive; “the people” is created and recreated via the suppression of the concrete 
people themselves, in every border operation of admission or exclusion, and 
identification or differentiation. 
Consequently, far from being rendered obsolete by deterritorialization, borders 
perform a function that is perfectly compatible with contemporary global affairs.  By 
perpetually and pervasively effecting the suppression of the concrete subjects of 
collective political identities, national borders inherit the sovereign territorial ideal’s 
subordination of subjects to space, and adapt it to a post-territorial and postmodern world.  
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No longer subordinate to space, concrete subjects are now suppressed by their own 
alienated, objectified and abstracted negotiations of collective political identity. 
All of this suggests that, in the words of the anti-G8 poster cited in the 
introduction to this paper (page 3), “As deterritorialisation is enacted, everyone finds 
themselves constituent of a new social reality” (FelS and image-shift 2007).  This new 
reality, however, is not the unbordered world that the poster’s creators hope for and work 
toward.  Rather, it is one in which borders take on a particularly post-territorial role, 
intensifying and multiplying the heteronymous, undemocratic and alienated constitution 
of polities and collective political identities first theorized by Machiavelli in 1513 and 
elaborated by Marx in the early 1840’s.  If we look forward to a new form of social life, 
one that truly renders this modern logic obsolete, we will have to pin our hopes to 
something other than deterritorialization.  That something, as I have suggested, may very 
well be a recovery of the concrete bordering subject.  By theorizing the activity of 
bordering, revealing the alienation, objectification and abstraction of this activity, and 
tracking the intensified suppression of the concrete bordering subject in the movement 
from modernity to the present, I hope to have opened new paths toward such a recovery.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 58 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Adorno, T.  1969.  “Society,” Salmagundi 10-11: 144-53.  F. Jameson, trans.  
 
Alker, H and Shapiro, M., eds.   1996.  Challenging Boundaries.  Minneapolis:  
    University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Althusser, L.  2000.  Machiavelli and Us.  G. Elliot, trans.  London: Verso. 
 
Anderson, M.  1996.  Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World.   
    Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Ansell, C.  2004.  “Restructuring Authority and Territoriality” in Ansell, C. and Di  
    Palma, G., eds.  Restructuring Territoriality: Europe and the United States Compared.   
    Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ansell, C. and Di Palma, G., eds.  2004.  Restructuring Territoriality: Europe and the  
    United States Compared.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Anzaldúa, G.  1999.  Borderlands/ La Frontera.  2nd ed.  San Francisco: Aunt Lute  
    Books.   
 
Babington, C.  “President Defends Immigration Bill,” Associated Press.  June 9, 2007.   
    Accessed June 12 at www.forbes.com. 
 
Bader, V.  2005.  “Ethics of Immigration,” Constellations v. 12:3, p. 331-361. 
 
Balibar, E.  1995.  The Philosophy of Marx.  C. Turner, trans.  London: Verso. 
 
----.  2004  We, the People of Europe?.  J. Swenson, trans.  Princeton: Princeton  
    University Press. 
 
Baud, M. and van Schendel, W.  1997.  “Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands,”  
    Journal of World History 8, no. 2: 211-242. 
 
Beltran, C.  2004.  “Patrolling Borders: Hybrids, Hierarchies and the Challenge of  
    Mestizaje,” Political Research Quarterly, 57, no. 4: 595-607. 
 
Benhabib, S.  2004.  The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens.  Cambridge:  
    Cambridge University Press. 
 
----.  2006.  Another Cosmopolitanism: Hospitality, Sovereignty and Democratic  
    Iterations.  Oxford: Oxford University Press.   
 
 59 
Berg, E. and van Houtum, H., eds.  2003.  Routing Borders Between Territories,  
    Discourses and Practices.  Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
 
Berger, P. and Luckman, T.  1967.  The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the  
    Sociology of Knowledge.  New York: Anchor Books. 
 
Biersterker, T. and Weber, C., eds.  1996.  State Sovereignty as a Social Construct.   
    Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Biger, G. and The International Boundaries Research Unit.  1995.  The Encyclopedia of  
    International Boundaries.  Jerusalem: Jerusalem Publishing House. 
 
Borgatta, E. and Montgomery, R., eds. 2001.  Encyclopedia of Sociology, Vol. 3.  2nd ed.   
    New York: Macmillan Reference.   
 
Butler, J., Laclau, E., and Zizek, S.  2000.  Contingency, Hegemony and Universality.   
    London: Verso. 
 
Connolly, W.  1991.  Identity\Difference.  Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
Dahbour, O.  2005.  “Borders, Consent, and Democracy,” Journal of Social Philosophy  
    36, no. 2: 255-272. 
 
do Amaral, I.  1994.  “New Reflections on the Theme of International Boundaries” in  
    Schofield, C., ed.  World Boundaries, Volume 1: Global Boundaries. New York:  
    Routledge. 
 
Donnan, H. and Wilson, T., eds.  Border Identities.  1998.  Cambridge: Cambridge  
    University Press 
 
----.  1999.  Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State.  Oxford: Berg Press. 
 
Doty, R.  1996.  “Sovereignty and the Nation: Constructing the Boundaries of National  
    Identity” in Biersterker, T. and Weber, C., eds.  State Sovereignty as a Social  
    Construct.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Douglas, W.  1998.  “A Western Perspective on an Eastern Interpretation of Where North  
    Meets South: Pyrenean Borderland Cultures” in Donnan, H. and Wilson, T., eds.   
    Border Identities.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Federation for American Immigration Reform.  2006.  “Bush Immigration Speech Calls  
    for Same Old Illegal Alien Amnesty and Guest Worker Program, Says the Federation  
    for American Immigration Reform,” available at  
http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=media_release4092007.  Accessed 
07/28/2007. 
 
 60 
----.  2003.  “Ford Foundation Funding Groups Against Stricter Border Control,”  
    transcript of The O’Reilly Factor, broadcast 02/18/2003.  Available at  
    http://www.steinreport.com/danstein_oreilly_02182003.htm.  Accessed 07/28/2007. 
 
Ferguson, Y. and Mansbach, R.  2004  Remapping Global Politics: History’s Revenge  
    and Future Shock.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Foucault, M.  1995.  Discipline and Punish.  A. Sheridan, trans.  New York: Vintage. 
 
Foucualt, M.  2000.  “Governmentality” in Essential Works of Foucault Volume 3:  
    Power.  P. Rabinow, ed.  New York: New Press. 
 
Freud, S.  2003.  The Uncanny.  D. McLintock, trans.  New York: Penguin Books. 
 
Friedman, T.  1999.  The Lexus and the Olive Tree.  New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux 
 
Ganster, P. and Lorey, D., eds.  2005.  Borders and Borders Politics in a Globalizing  
    World.  New York: SR Books. 
 
Gramsci, A.  1989.  The Antonio Gramsci Reader.  D. Forgacs, ed.  New York: Schocken  
    Books. 
 
Jean-Marie Guehenno.  2000.  The End of the Nation-State.  V. Elliot, trans.   
    Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Hardt, M. and Negri, A.  2004.  Multitude.  New York: Penguin Books. 
 
Hayer, T.  2004.  Open Borders: The Case Against Immigration Controls.  2nd edition.   
    Ann Arbor: Pluto Press. 
 
Hirst, P. and Thompson, G.  1999.  Globalization in Question: The International  
    Economy and the Possibilities of Governance.  2nd ed.  Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Jakarainen, P.  2005.  “The Attitudes of the Youth toward the Other Side: The Finnish- 
    Swedish and Finnish-Russian Borders” in Ganster, P. and Lorey, D., eds. Borders and  
    Borders Politics in a Globalizing World.  New York: SR Books. 
 
Jennings, I.  1956.  The Approach to Self-Government.  Cambridge: Cambridge  
    University Press. 
 
Krasner, S.  2001.  “Abiding Sovereignty,” International Political Science Review 22, no.  
    3: 229-251. 
 
Laclau, E.  2007.  Emancipation(s).  London: Verso. 
 
Laclau, E., ed.  1994.  The Making of Political Identities.  London: Verso.    
 61 
 
Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C.  2001.  Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 2nd ed.  London:  
    Verso. 
 
Laclau, E.  and Zac, L.  1994.  “Minding the Gap: The Subject of Politics” in Laclau, E.,  
    ed.  The Making of Political Identities.  London: Verso.     
 
Lindhal, H.  2007.  “Give and Take: Arendt and the Nomos of Political Community,”  
    Philosophy and Social Criticism 33, no. 7: 881-901. 
 
Lukács, G.  1971.  “Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat” in History and 
    Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics.  Rodney Livingstone, trans.    
    Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Machiavelli, N.  1998.  The Prince.  2nd ed.  H. Mansfield, trans.  Chicago: University of  
    Chicago Press. 
 
Matthews J.  1997.  “Power Shift,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 1: 50-66. 
 
Martínez, O.  1994.  Border People: Life and Society in the US-Mexico Borderlands.   
    Tucson: University of Arizona Press. 
 
Marx, K.  1973.  Grundrisse.  M. Nicolaus, trans.  New York: Penguin Books. 
 
----.  1978a.  “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right” in Marx, K. and Engels, F.  The  
    Marx-Engels Reader.  2nd ed.  R. Tucker, ed.  New York: Norton. 
 
----.  1978b.  “On the Jewish Question” in Marx, K. and Engels, F.  The Marx-Engels  
    Reader.  2nd ed.  R. Tucker, ed.  New York: Norton. 
 
----.  1978c.  “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844” in Marx, K. and Engels,  
    F.  The Marx-Engels Reader.  2nd ed.  R. Tucker, ed.  New York: Norton. 
 
----.  1978d.  The German Ideology in Marx, K. and Engels, F.  The Marx-Engels Reader.   
    2nd ed.  R. Tucker, ed.  New York: Norton. 
 
----.  1978e.  The Holy Family in Marx, K. and Engels, F.  The Marx-Engels Reader.  2nd  
    ed.  R. Tucker, ed.  New York: Norton. 
 
----.  1990.  Capital Volume 1.  B. Fowkes, trans.  New York: Penguin Books. 
 
Marx, K. and Engels, F.  1978.  The Marx-Engels Reader.  2nd ed.  R. Tucker, ed.  New  
    York: Norton. 
 
Maus, I.  2006.  “From Nation-State to Global State, or the Decline of Democracy,”  
    Constellations 13, no 4: 465-484. 
 62 
 
Michaelsen, S. and Johnson, E., eds.  1997.  Border Theory: The Limits of Cultural  
    Politics.  Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 
 
Morefield, J.  2005.  “States Are Note People: Harold Laski on Unsettling Sovereignty,  
    Rediscovering Democracy,” Political Research Quarterly 58, no. 4: 659-669. 
 
Murphy, A.  1996.  “The Sovereign State System as a Political-Territorial Ideal:  
    Historical and Contemporary Considerations” in Biersterker, T. and Weber, C., eds.   
    State Sovereignty as a Social Construct.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Newman, D., ed.  1999a.  Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity.  Portland, OR: Frank  
    Cass Publishers. 
 
Newman, D.  1999b.  “Geopolitics Renaissant: Territory, Sovereignty and the World  
    Political Map” in Newman, D., ed.  Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity.   
    Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers. 
 
----.  2003.  “Boundary Geopolitics: Toward a Territorial Theory of Lines?” in Berg, E.  
    and van Houtum, H., eds.  Routing Borders Between Territories, Discourses and  
    Practices.  Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
 
----.  2006a.  “Borders and Bordering: Towards and Interdisciplinary Dialogue,”  
    European Journal of Social Theory 9, no. 2: 171-186. 
 
----.  2006b.  “The Lines That Continue to Separate Us: Borders in Our ‘Borderless’  
    World,” Progress in Human Geography 30, no. 2: 1-19. 
  
No One Is Illegal!  2003.  “Manifesto of the No On Is Illegal Group (UK),” available at  
    http://noii.trick.ca/OurManifesto.  Accessed 07/28/2007. 
 
Ohmae, K.  1996.  The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies.  New  
    York: Free Press Paperbacks.  
 
Paasi, A.  1999.  “Boundaries as Social Processes: Territoriality in the World of Flows”  
    in Newman, D., ed.  Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity.  Portland, OR: Frank  
    Cass Publishers. 
 
----.  2005a.  “Boundaries as Social Practice and Discourse: The Finnish-Russian Border”  
    in Ganster, P. and Lorey, D., eds. Borders and Borders Politics in a Globalizing  
    World.  New York: SR Books. 
 
----.  2005b.  “The Changing Discourses on Political Boundaries: Mapping the  
    Backgrounds, Contexts and Contents” in van Houtum, et al., eds.  B/ordering Space.   
    Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
 
 63 
Rawls, J.  1999.  The Law of Peoples.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Ruggie, J.  1993. “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International  
    Relations,” International Organization 47, no. 1: 139-174.  
 
Sack, R.  1986.  Human Territoriality.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Sahlins, P.  1998.  “State Formation and National Identity in the Catalan Borderlands  
    During the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries” in Donnan, H. and Wilson, T., eds.   
    Border Identities.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Strang, D.  1996.  “Contested Sovereignty: The Social Construction of Colonial  
    Imperialism” in Biersterker, T. and Weber, C., eds.  State Sovereignty as a Social  
    Construct.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Schofield, C., ed.  1994.  World Boundaries, Volume 1: Global Boundaries.  New York:  
    Routledge. 
 
Soguk, N.  1996.  “Transnational/Transborder Bodies: Resistance, Acommodation, and  
    Exile in Refugee and Migration Movements on the U.S-Mexican Border” in Shapiro,  
    M. and Alker, H., eds.  Challenging Boundaries.  Minneapolis: University of  
    Minnesota Press. 
 
Tosel, A.  2002.  “Marx et les abstractions,” Archives de Philosophie v. 65:2, p. 311-334. 
 
van Houtum, H.  2005.  “The Geopolitics of Borders and Boundaries,” Geopolitics 10:  
    672-9. 
 
van Houtum, H., Kramsch, O. and Ziefhofer W., eds.  2005.  B/ordering Space.   
    Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
 
Viktorova, J.  2003.  “Bridging Identity and Alterity: An Apologia for Boundaries” in  
    Berg, E. and van Houtum, H., eds.  Routing Borders Between Territories, Discourses  
    and Practices.  Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
 
Vila, P.  2000.  Crossing Borders, Reinforcing Borders.  Austin: University of Texas  
    Press. 
 
Weber, M.  2004.  The Vocation Lectures.  Rodney Livingstone, trans.  Indianapolis:  
    Hackett Publishing Co. 
 
